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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GLOBE GRAIN AND MILLING
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 6050

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and ALBERT
E. THOMAS,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF AND ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT.
This brief is submitted in opposition to the petition
filed by GLobe Grain and Milling Company for a rehearing of the case of Globe Grain and Milling Company v.
Industrial Commission of Utah and Thoma,s, decided
June 20, 1939, (Utah, 91 P. (2d) 512), as well as in reply
to the arguments advanced by amici curiae urging this
court to reconsider and annul the decision it previously
rendered.

2
No issue is raised upon this rehearing witH respect
to the facts £ound by the Industrial Commission and by
the court, which are set forth at length in the court's
opinion. The issues are rather as to the interpretations
to be given to provisions in the unemployment compensation law.
The grounds upon which rehearing is s<ought by the
Globe Grain and Milling Company are stated on pages
1-3 of its petition for rehearing. An examination of
the allegations enumerated in the petition indicates, that
apart from the question whether the Industrial Commission was bound to entertain an appeal from the determination of the appeal tribunal and was required under
the law to grant Globe Grain and Milling Company a
hearing before the Industrial Commission (Petition for
Rehearing, points 2 (b) and (c), p. 3), the subject matter
of the assignments of error all were previously oonsidered by this court upon the original hearing. The
brief of amici curiae, in addition to urging a reversal for
the reasons advanced by Globe Grain and Milling Company, suggests that the decision previously rendered by
this court should be annulled because, first, there is no
proof in the record to show that Globe Grain and Milling
Company is an employer, as defined in the act (Amici
Brief, pp. 2, 3), and, second, the unemployment compensation law, in their opinion, does not authorize the Industrial Commission to determine the contribution liability of the Globe Grain and Milling Company and
require it to file wage reports; and if the law be construed to oontain such an authorization, it is in conflict

3
with Art. XIII, Sec. 11 of the State Constitution in that
it permits the Industrial Commission to perform functions under a ''tax law" which can be exercised only by
the State Tax Commission (Amici Brief, pp. 3-15).
The Industrial Commission, however, takes the position that the original decision of this court in this case
should be affirmed and that the petition of Globe Grain
and Milling Company for a rehearing of this cause
should be denied. The Industrial Commission contends:
First, that Globe Grain and Milling Company cannot
for the first time on this application for rehearing assail
the correctness of the procedure before the Industrial
Commission which resulted in the order awarding unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant Thomas;
Second, that the award was properly made under
terms of the State unemployment compensation act;
Third, that amici curiae are in no position to attack
the validity of the proceedings of the Industrial Commission under the law, the order issued by the CommissiOn, or the validity of the provisions of the statute;
and
Fourth, that even if it he assumed that the new
matter suggested by Globe Grain and Milling Company
in its petition for rehearing and by amici curiae in
their brief were pDoperly in issue, the decision previously rendered by this court should he affirmed in all
respects,

4

L
THE FSSIUE A:S TO WHETHIDR GLOBE GRAIN AND MILLING
COMPANY IS AN EMPLOYER AS DEFINED IN THE UNEJMRLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT AND THE ISSUES AS
TO WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS AUTHORIZIDD BY THE STATUTE TO MAKE THE ORDER APPEALED FROM, AND IF THE STATUTE DID SO AUTHORIZE,
WHETHER IT CONTRAVENEID THE CONSTITUTION, CANNOT BE CONSIDEREID IN THIS PROCEE'DING.

A. The question of whether Globe Grain and Milling Company is an employer under the unemployment c;ompensation statute cannot be
considered at this stage of the proceeding.
In reliance, apparently, upon the decision of this
court in Roberts v. Elder, decided August 15, 1939, (not
yet reported), amici curiae make much of the fact that
the record made before the Industrial Commissi,on does
not establish, either affirmatively or by a stipulation of
the parties, that Globe Grain and Milling Company was
an employer subject to the provisions of the unemployment compensation act. No such contention, howe;ver,
was made by Globe Grain and Milling Company. in its
original petition for a writ of review, nor in its original
brief, and no such contention is made by the company
in its application for rehearing.

Accordingly, this con-

tention, not having been listed by a party to the suit
as a ground for reversal of the decision of the Industrial Commission in its original petition for a writ of
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review, it cannot be considered by the court because
''An inflexible rule of this court requires that every
proposition relied on as grounds for reversing a judgment must be assigned as error in the original petition
for review." Pingree National Bank v. Weber Oownty,
54 Utah 599, 183 P. 334, 336; Dahlquist v. Denver and
Rio Grande Railway Company, 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833,
844.
It is equally well settled that this issue cannot be
raised by an amicus curiae neither upon an original
hearing nor upon a rehearing. An amicus has no control
over a suit. His function is merely to assist the court
in its consideration of the issues framed by parties; he
has no standing to assist in the framing of issues by
pleadings or otherwise. Therefore, since Globe Grain
and Milling Company has evidenced no interest on its
part to contest its status as an employer under the
unemployment compensation act, and merely confined its
application for rehearing to those matters set forth in
its petition, the issue raised by amici curiae only as to
whether or not Globe Grain and Milling Company is an
employer and whether the reeord sufficiently supports
that conclusion is not a proper one for consideration in
this proceeding. Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co., (La.
App. 1933), 149 So. 126, 129; Union Steam Pump Sales
Co. v. Deland, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. vV. 353, 354; State v.
City of Albuquerque, 31 N. Mex. 576, 249 P. 242, 248;
Moffat Twnnel Improvement District v. Denver & S. L.
Ry. Co., 49 Fed. (2d) 715, 722 (C. C. lOth, 1930), cert.

denied 283 U. S. 837; Corning v. Patton, (Ala. 1938), 182
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So. 39, 42; Hall v. Esslinger, (Ala. 1938), 179 So. 639;
City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. (2d)
1175, 1176.
The rule concerning the province of amici curiae to
raise issues not the subject of an assignment of error
by a party to a suit is tersely .summarized in City of
Phoenix v. Drinkwater, supra. In that case, the Supreme
Oourt of Arizona refused to ·consider issues raised by
amicus curiae in his brief but with respect to which the
parties made no complaint upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of Arizona, and said (p. 1176):
''The Arizona Municipal League asked for and
received permission to file a brief as amicus
curiae. In such brief, in addition to arguing
the questions raised by the assignments of error
presented by defendant, it has attempted to assign other errors and to argue them. This is
not within the rights of an amicus curiae, and we,
therefore, consider the brief of the League only
so far as it discusses questions raised properly
by defendant's assignments of error. Farmers'
Union Ditch Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Oo., 37
Col. 512, 86 P. 1042."
Even if the status of Globe Grain and Milling Company as an employer under the unemployment compensation act of this State were properly in issue before
this court in this proceeding, the certified copy of the
status report of the company, attached as "Exhibit A" to
this prief (p. 117 infra), would dispose of the contention
made by amici curiae. The contention of amici is based
upon the argument that there is no evidence in the
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£ormal record before the Industrial Commission which
would justify it in reaching the conclusion that Globe
Grain and Milling Company employed a sufficient number of individuals during the calendar years involved
to constitute it an employer under the unemployment
compensation act. Although such evidence was not formally reflected in the transcript, the fact, nevertheless,
remains that this company, by its own admission, has
been an employer subject to the unemployment compensation act since its passage. It has filed wage reports, and has paid contributions periodically to the
unemployment compensation fund. At no time has it
ever seriously contested its liability as an employer. The
only issue which it has seen fit to raise is whether
Thomas, the claimant for benefits in this proceeding,
was engaged in employment, as that term is defined in
the unemployment compensation law.
Although ordinarily courts do not consider evidence
not in the record on appeal, it is clearly within the
province of the court to accept in this case as evidence
of the status of Globe Grain and Milling Company the
certified copy of the employment record filed with this
brief. Appellate courts are fully empowered to accept
supplementary evidence where to do so would avoid miscarriages of justice or unnecessary circuity of action.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Ridge v. Manker, 132 Fed. 599 (1904) stated
the applicable rule in the following terms (p. 601):
"An appellate court may avail itself of authentic
evidence outside of the record before it of matters
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occuring since the decree of the trial court when
such course is necessary to prevent a miscarriage
of justice, to avoid a useless circuity of proceeding, to preserve a jurisdiction lawfully acquired,
or to protect itself from imposition or further
prosecution of litigation where the controversy
between the parties has been settled, or for ·other
reasons has ceased to exist. Chamberlain v.
Cleveland, 1 Black, 419, 17 L. Ed. 93; Lord v.
Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L. Ed. 1067; Wood Paper
Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333, 19 L. Ed. 379; Board of
Liquidation v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 221, 3 Sup.
Ct. 144, 27 L. Ed. 916; Dakota v. Glidden, 113
U. S. 222, 5 Sup. Ct. 428, 28 L. Ed. 981; Little v.
Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 10 Sup. Ct. 620, 33 L. Ed.
1016; vVashington and Idaho Railroad Co. v.
Coeur D'Alene R. & N. Co., 160 U. S. 101, 16
Sup. Ct. 239, 40 L. Ed. 355; Bryar v. Campbell,
177 U. S. 649, 20 Sup. Ct. 794, 44 L. Ed. 926.''
See also: Caldwell v. Modern Woodmen, 89 Kans.
11, 133 P. 843, 844; Burgess v. Las by, et al., 91 Mont.
482, 9 P. (2d) 164, 166; Schevenell v. Blackwood, 35 F.
( 2d) 421, 423.
If the issue of whether Globe Grain and Milling

Company was an employer had been raised before the
Industrial Commission, unquestionably the document annexed to this brief as an exhibit or some other similar
proof would have been put in evidence in the hearings
before the Commission, and would have appeared in
the record originally presented to this court.

The im-

portance of the proof represented by the exhibit arises
at this time only by virtue of a contention of amici
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curiae-a contention raised only after the decision of this
-court on the original appeal to this court.
But, if for any reason, this court is inclined to
consider the absence of evidence in the formal record
of the employer-status of Globe Grain and Milling Oompany, we submit that it should not dispose of this case
and enter final judgment without affmding an opportunity to the parties, by remanding the case to the Industrial Commission, to perfect the reoord in those respects
in which the court deems it to be insufficient. Colorado
Public Welfare Board v. Viles, Supreme Court of Colorado, October 2, 1939. (A Copy of this decision is
attached hereto "Exhibit B ", p. 118 infra.)
B. The issues as to whether the Industrial Commission invalidly exercised "tax" authority or
whether the unemployment compensation law
invalidly delegates such authority to the Industrial Commission are not matters for consideration in this proceeding.
Amici curiae contend that the Industrial Commission's order in this case is invalid because in the course
of determining the benefit rights of Thomas, the claimant, it ordered Gl,obe Grain and Milling Company to file
a liability report with respect to the wages paid to
Thomas and to pay contributions.

This contention

seems to be supported by the following argument:

The

unemployment compensation law does not authorize the
Industrial Commission to determine contribution liability
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and if the statute be read so as to permit such determinations, it is invalid because in conflict with Article
XIII, Sec. 11 of the State Constitution. •
This attack on the validity of the order of the
Industrial Commission is presented only by amici curiae.
It is not a ground upon which Globe Grain and Milling
Company seeks a reversal of the Commission's determination; neither is it a ground upon which the company seeks rehearing. The authorities uniformly hold
that an amicus curiae cannot be heard to challenge the
validity of a law or its application upon grounds not
advanced by parties to the litigation. Amici curiae are
not aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Commission which requires Globe Grain and Milling Company
to file a "tax" liability report with respect to the wages
paid to Thomas and to pay contributions thereon. That
issue can be determined in a proper case where a similar
order is directed to a party to the proceeding who
chooses to challenge the order on such gDounds, and
a decision in this case would not foreclose the possibility of this question being considered by the court at
a later date. It has been repeatedly held in numerous
decisions of State Supreme Courts and of the United
States Supreme Court that constitutional issues can be

State ex rel.
Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. (2d) 408, 413;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571; Southern Ry.
raised only by those adversely affected.

*Article XIII, Bee. 11 of the State Constitution provides in part, as
follows: "The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise
the tax ~aws of the State."
·
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Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 544; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S.
152, 160; In re Knowles, 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797;
Asplund v. Alarid, 29 N.Mex. 129, 219 P. 786; 6 R. C. L.
"Constitutional Law", section 87. This rule, that a person may only raise questions which directly affect his
own interests and may not invoke questions which may
properly be raised only by others, is rigidly followed
with respect to amici curiae. In State v. Martin, 210
Iowa 207, 230 N. W. 540, the Supreme Court of Iowa
said (p. 543):
"The eourt will not, at the instance of a stranger
to the litigation, search for or pass upon grounds
of invalidity of the statute not presented by the
parties. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410, 127 Am. St. Rep.
478; State v. Lee, 288 Mo. 679, 233 S. vV. 20."
And in State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N. Mex.
576, 249 P. 242, the Supreme Court of New Mexieo, in
refusing to consider an issue of invalidity raised exelusively by an amicus curiae, said (p. 248):
''Only persons claiming to be adversely affected
are authorized to question the constitutionality
of an act * * * and particularly is this true
of amicus curiae whose authority is to call the
court's attention to facts or situations that may
have escaped consideration. He is not a party
and cannot assume the functions of a party. He
must accept the case before the court with the
issues made by the parties. In re McClellan's
Estate v. State, 27 S. Dak. 109, 129 N. vV. 1037,
Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1029; Farmers', etc., Co. et al. v.
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Rio Grande Canal Co., et al., 37 Colo. 512, 86
P. 1042; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison,
199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410, 127 Am. St. Rep. 478.
''The constitutim1ality of the provision in question is not contested by an authorized person,
and jurisdiction of the court is not involved.
Cram v. Ry. Co., 85 Neb. 586, 123 N. vV. 1045, 26
L. R. A. ( N. S.) 1028, 19 Ann. Cas. 170, and note
at page 175; 12 C. J. "Constitutional Law," S.
217. Under these circumstances, this c>ourt will
not raise the questi~on on its own account, and
amici curiae have no authority to do so."
See also: In re Koot.z' Will, ("Wis. 1938), 280 N. W.
672; Davis v. McCasland, (Okla. 1938), 75 P. (2d) 1118;
3 Cor. Jur. (Secundum) 1050.

II.
EVEN IF THIS ISSUE IS PHOPERLY BEFORE THE COURT, THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD DETERMINE WHETHER
THOMAS WAS IN "E,MPLOYMENT" AS DEFINED BY THE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW: THE LEGISLATURE, IN CONFERRING UPON THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE POWER TO DETERMINE "EMPLOYMENT", DID
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 11 OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.

A. The Industrial Commission is authorized to conduct proceedings to determine the validity of
claims f,or benefits and, pursuant to such authorization, may determine whether a claimant was
engaged in employment.
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In enacting the Utah unemployment compensation
law, the legislature entrusted its administration to the
Industrial Commission (section 11). It imposed upon
this Commission the duty to administer the act, granted
it full authority to issue rules and regulations, within
the framework of the law, to accomplish its purposes,
and empowered the Industrial Commission ''to require
such reports" and "make such investigations" as it
might deem necessary to carry out the provisions ,of the
statute (section ll(a) ). One of the clear statutory duties
vested in the Commission is that relating to the payment
of benefits to those entitled thereto under the law (sections 4 and 5). Section 4( e) of the law, (Chapter 43,
Sessi,on Laws of 1937) prior to the amendment thereof
in 1939, (Chapter 52, Se~ssion Laws of 1939) provided
that an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week "only if it has been
found by the Commission" that he has, "within the first
four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the benefit year,"
earned wages ''for employment by empl,oyers '' in a
specified amount. Further, section 19 (j) (5) of the law
requires the exclusions from ''employment'' to be determined by ''the commission'' which, in turn, is specifically defined by section 19 (f) of the law to mean ''the
industrial commission of Utah." Thus, by the terms of
the statute, the Commission is under a duty to determine
whether a claimant earned wages in "employment."
Moreover, ,section 6 (b) of the original law and sec6(c) of the law as amended provide that if an appeal
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tribunal or the Commission affirms a decision all:owing
benefits, "such benefits shall be paid regardless of any
appeal which may be taken, but if such decision is finally
reversed, no employer's account shall be charged for the
benefits so paid.'' Manifestly, no benefits could be paid
unless and until the Commission or its representatives
or the appeal tribunal decided that services perf.ormed
for wages or under a contract of hire constituted employment as defined by the law. To hold that the Industrail Commission does not possess the power to determine ''employment'' Wiould be to destroy integral parts
of the law. It would amount to ignoring completely
section 4 (e) of the law; the provisions of section 6
which are designed to set up procedures for the determination of claims for benefit and to afford benefit
claimants a speedy determination of their rights; as
well as the provisions of sections 19 ( j) ( 5) and 19 (f).
In short, the statute contemplates that the Industrial
Commission shall determine when benefits are payable
and in doing so the Commission is under a duty, if the
question is in dispute, to determine whether the claimant has satisfied all conditions of eligibility including
the condition enumerated in section 4(e). In arguing
that no authority to determine the existence of the employment relationship has been conferred upon the Industrial Commission, amici curiae, by stressing section
14(b) only, and in arguing that in all cases where "employment'' is in dispute, the issue can be resolved only
by a court suit for contributions, appear to have completely overlooked the mandates of the law contained in
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sections 4, 5, 6, 19 (j) ( 5) and 19 (f), that such determinations be made by the Industrial Commission, as well
as the policy embodied in the law which calls for the
speedy determination of benefit rights by the Industrial
Commission. See Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124. In addition, their argument concerning section 14(b) of the statute seems to
misconstrue completely the effect of determinations of
"employment" by the Industrial Commission for benefit
payment purposes and the relati,onship of such decisions
to court actions to recover contributions (See Amici
Brief pp. 4 and 5). As was indicated above, section
19(j) (5) of the law as well as sections 6 and 4(e) empower the Industrial Commission to determine the issue
of "employment" for benefit payment purposes. From
decisions of this character, employers may appeal to this
court. (See secti,on 6(h) Chapter 43, Session Laws of
1937; section 10(i) Chapter 52, Session Laws of 1939).
Should an employer appeal to this court and the
court affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission,
in a subsequent suit by the State Tax Commission for
contributions on the wages paid to the claimant whose
status under the Act was determined, the District Court
would be compelled to follow the decision of this court
with respect to the existence of the employment relationship as finally decided by this court for the purpose
,of paying benefits to the claimant. And should the
employer fail to appeal to this court from the decision
of the Industrial Commission, the District Court in a
suit for contributions would be required to follow the
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decisi,on of the Industrial Commission m so far as it
determined for benefit purposes the existence of the
employment relationship between an employer and a
claimant, not simply because it was a decision of the
Industrial Commission, as such, but because the employer had an opportunity under the terms of the statute
to secure judicial review of the decision and, in failing
to do so, was bound thereby. This would not preclude
an employer from contesting other issues relative to the
suit for contributions; it would only, under well recognized principles of law, prevent relitigation of an issue
already decided, or the opening up, by way of a collateral
attack, of an issue previously settled. Chicago N. S.
& M. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. 360, 163 N. E.
141, 147; Hoyne v. Chicago & 0. R. Elevated Ry. Co.,
294 Ill. 413, 128 N. E. 587, 591; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Blake, 154 Okla. 151, 7 P. (2d) 153,
155; Warren County v. Mississippi River Ferry Co.,
170 Miss. 183, 154 So. 349, 351; United States Fidelity
Co. v. Superior Court of City of San Francisco, 214
Cal. 468,6 P. (2d) 243; Abrott v. Athanastos, (Cal. App.
1936) 61 P. (2d) 982, 984.
B. In conferring authority upon the Industrial
Commiss1on to make determinations with respect
to the existence of the employment relationship,
the unemployment compensation law is not in
conflict with the State Constitution.
Amici curiae in their brief (pages 9-15) claim that
if the unemployment compensation law is so construed
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as to confer authority upon the Industrial Commission
to determine the existence of the employment relationship and to require Globe Grain and Milling Company to
file "tax" liability reports and to pay contributions,
it is invalid because in violation of Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. That provision reads
in part as follows:
"The State Tax Commission shall administer and
supervise the tax lavvs of the State.''
When reduced to the form of logical propositions,
the contention of amici curiae seems t~o resolve itself into
either or both of the following syllogisms:
1. The constitutional provision applies to all exactions levied in pursuance of the taxing power of the
State; "contributions" are "taxes" levied in pursuance
of the taxing power of the State; therefore, the contributions are subject to the administrative jurisdiction
of the State Tax Commission.

2. "Tax Laws", as used in the Constituti,on, signifies all laws levying compulsory exactions; "contributions'' are compulsory exactions; therefore, contributions are taxes subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the State Tax Oommission.
-When expressed in syllogistic form the argument
has an apparent and superficial validity which disappears upon closer scrutiny and analysis. The Industrial
Commission denies the conclusions reached because a
premise of each .syllogism is faulty.

For example, in
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the case of syllogism '' 1'' it is denied that contributions
are levied in pursuance of the taxing power and are
taxes. To the contrary, it is maintained that they are
exactions levied in pursuance of the police power of the
State. In the case of syllogism "2" it is denied that
the Constitution uses the words "tax laws" to mean
any and all statutes levying oompulsory exactions. We
believe reference is intended, rather, to those laws imposing exacti,ons which are justified as an exercise of
the taxing power exclusively.
The view that the unemployment compensation law
may be sustained as an exercise of the police power
has already been accepted by this court in its previous
decision in this case. In Globe Grain and Milling Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah), 91 P.
(2d) 512 it was said at page 517:
"Both workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation as enacted in this state may,
we think, be sustained as proper exercises of the
police povYer, not to be restrained by the due
process clause.''
Likewise, in Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Commission, (Mass. 1936), 5 N. E.
(2d) 720, in which an employer denied his obligation
to pay contributions on constitutional grounds, the court
sustained the unemployment oompensation law as a
proper exercise of the State's police power. As in the
instant case, the plaintiff, among other contentions,
claimed that the Constitution of the Commonwealth was
violated in that the contributions were not handled in
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the manner designated therein for tax receipts.
court in answer said at pages 725, et seq.:

The

"The Unemployment Compensation Law does
not throw the burden of its expense upon funds
obtained by general taxation. It puts that burden
upon the employers and empl,oyees not exempted
from its operation. * * * The solution put
forward after deliberation is the law here assailed. The connection between employers and unemployment is not remote and is affected by
general business conditions. This law was enacted in the exercise of the police power. * * *
Many laws which interfere to some extent with
freedom of contract and which cause additional
expense to individuals have been upheld as valid
exertions of the police power.
"Workmen's compensation acts have been supported as an exercise of the police power. Their
effect is to impose on the designated classes of
employers of labor the burden of compensation
for injuries to employees arising out of and in
the cour,se of their employment, leaving the
employer to reimburse himself for the expense
as a part of the 0ost of his product. (Citations
omitted). In reason it is difficult to distinguish
these decisions from the cases at bar.
"The principle is familiar that, within reasonable
limits, the legislative department of government
in mitigation of a public evil may place the cost
on those in connection with whose business the
evil arises. Statutes have been sustained pr,oviding f,or the collection of a percentage of deposits
from State banks for the purpose of creating a
guaranty fund to pay losses caused to depositors
by the insolvency of any such banks. * * *

* * * * * * *
"It cannot rightly be determined that the Unemployment Compensation Law takes the property
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of the plaintiffs without due process of law. The
contributions are exacted from the plaintiffs as
well as from employees to effectuate some regulation of the evils of unemployment, in which both
groups are inter~sted and which is a subject within the scope of legislative competency. * * *
The scheme of this law being within the police
power, minor inequalities are not decisive against
it.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"By the Unemployment Compensation Law, in
substance and effect great sums of money are to
be collected by compulsion of the Commonwealth
from employers and employees. rrhese sums are
described in the law as 'contributions'. These
contributions are not eollected in the ordinary
way but are paid to the comission and then paid
over to the State Treasurer as a fund to be used
to pay benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law. The State Treasurer is directed
to deposit or invest the fund in the 'unemployment trust fund' of the United States government and keep it so deposited and invested, except as he may be entitled to requisition such
sums standing to his account as may be required
by the commission to pay benefits in accordance
with the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law. These contributions paid by employers manifestly are received on account of the
Commonwealth. The contributions under the
Unemployment Compensation Law are not a part
of the general revenue of the Commonwealth although paid into the State Treasury. They are
raised by the Commonwealth for a particular purpose through the exercise of the police power.
• • *

* * * * * * *
"The Commonwealth has intervened in the exercise of its police power to relieve against the
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acute evils of unemployment. * * * In principle these contributions stand on the same footing as the payments for insurance against personal injuries which are a valid part of almost
every workmen's compensation act." (Italics
supplied).
The Supreme Court of Missis·sippi has likewise sustained the validity of the unemployment compensation
law of that State under its police power in Tatum v.
Wheeless, (Miss. 1936), 178 So. 95, 101. The court said
at page 101:
"A state, under its police power, has very large
authority and discretion as to the recognition of
public needs, and may pr·ovide for them by suitable legislation. This state has often exercised
this power in the regulation or management of
business affecting public welfare, and has enacted
laws in restraint of acts deemed inimical to the
public welfare or not promotive of the public
good. * * *''
In support of the the·ory that unemployment compensation contributions are taxes, amici cites H elvering
v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U. S. 548, and language from Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868 quoted by
this court in its previous opinion.
Obviously Helvering v. Davis, supra, and Steward

Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, have no conceivable bearing
upon the issue of whether contributions under the State
law are required under the police power or the taxing
power of a State. These cases adjudicated, respectively,
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the validity under the federal Constitution of federal
taxes lo,oking to the receipt of revenue in connection
with the establishment of the federal old-age insurance
system and the plan to induce State action with respect
to unemployment.
Reliance upon the Carmichael case as an authority
for the proposition that State unemployment compensation contributions must be regarded as taxes
1s also misplaced. The Supreme Court of the
United States has clearly indicated that it is not
concerned whether a particular exaction 1s sustainable as an exercise of the police or taxation
power of a State. Its interest is confined to whether,
in a case before it, the statute involved, whatever the
power under which the legislature may have enacted
it, violates a limitation contained in the Federal Constitution. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U. S. 219, in which was adjudicated the validity of the
workmen's compensation law of the State of Washington, requiring payments to be made into State fund (as
does the Utah unempl,oyment compensation law), the
United States Supreme Court said (page 237):

'' * * * "\Ve are not here concerned with any
mere question of construction, nor with any distinction between the police and the taxing powers.
The question whether a state law deprives a person of rights secured by the Federal Constitution
depends not upon how it is characterized but
upon its practical operation and effect * * *
And the Federal Constitution does not require
a separate exercise by the states of their powers
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of regulation and taxation. Gundling v. Chicago,
177 U. S. 183, 189."
Thus, in view of the fact that the United States Supreme
Court does not undertake to determine the nature (in
terms of police or taxing power) of a required payment
as evidenced by its statement to that effect in the Carmichael case, 301 U. S. 495, 508, the Supreme Court's
concurrence with the view that the unemployment compensation contribution required to be paid under Alabama law is a tax, is entitled to little weight as a precedent on that point. The effect of its decision was merely
to accept, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, the
designation of contributi10ns as taxes made by the
Alabama Supreme Court in Beeland Wholesale Co. v.

Kaufman, (Ala. 1937), 174 So. 516.

In that case, the

Alabama Supreme Court denominated unemployment
compensation contributions as taxes.

They were so de-

scribed, however, because, under the Alabama Constituti•on, as interpreted by its courts, there is:

"*

* * no authority ·Of a State to take the
property of a citizen except by way ·of taxes or
eminent domain." (p. 520)

In short, unlike most other !States in Wlhich governmental exactions may be referrable to either the police
power or taxing power, in Alabama, if the contributi·ons
were not considered as an exercise of the taxing power,
they were wholly invalid because obviously not justified
as an exer·cise of the power of eminent domain.
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In view ·Of the circumstances described, none of the
decisions relied upon by amici curiae are of value as
precedents in this State where it is permi.ssible to distinguish between taxes in the technical sense, (i. e. compulsory payments exacted in pursuance of the taxing power) and t~hose ref err able to the police power. See Globe
Gmin & Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
supra; State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 P.
1013. This distinction is clearly marked out by this court
in State v. Packer Corporation, supra, in whi.ch this oourt
upheld against constitutional attack the validity of a
statute regulating traffic in cigarettes and levying fees
and impositions upon their sale. It was claimed that the
fees represented an exercise of the taxing power but
the court repudiated this argument and said:
''As an incident, and as a more efficient means
of regulation, the act requires payment of a
license fee by dealers and the payment of an excise tax on cigarettes. The fact that a considerable revenue is raised and paid into the public
treasury does not itself indicate that the act was
passed as a revenue measure nor destroy its
character as a regulat·ory act passed in the exercise of the police power, where the object is
to control, regulate and restrict rather than to
encourage the traffic.''

It is ·Of the greatest importanee to observe that although the argument ·of amici is based upon the theory
that contributions are "taxes", (Amici Brief, pp. 11, 12)
Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution refers
to "tax laws." Thus, the Constitution does not purport
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to give exclusive jurisdidi·on to the State Tax Commission with respect to the administration and supervision
of all laws involving eompulsory payments, but only
''tax laws.'' The Constitution, however, avoids the ambiguity inherent in the use of the common word "taxes"
and conveys the impression that the Tax Commission's
jurisdiction is restricted to laws which are imposed exclusively by virtue of the taxing power of the State. This
is clearly evidenced by the legislative exposition of this
provisi·on of the State Constitution. For example, the
monies paid by employers into the State Insurance Fund
under the Workmen's Compensation Law (a law which
is predicated on the exercise of the police power of the
state, Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah
246, 194 P. 122, 124) are collected and administered by
the Industrial Commission. (Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Sec.
42-2-3). Similarly under the fish and game laws, the Fish
and Game Commissioner collects fees and license monies
and determines liability therefor independently of the
State Tax Commission. These fees and monies are deposited by the Commissioner in a special fund which is
administered by him separate and apart from t1he general
funds of the state collected under "taxing laws." (Rev.
Stat. Utah 1933, Title 30). The Department of Registration likewise collects monies and determines issues of
liability with respect to many matters entrusted by the
legislature to it for supervision, administration and contl'ol. (Rev. Stat. Utah 19·33, Title 79). Like powers
have been vested in a?ministrative bodies other than the
State Tax Commission with respeet to the collection and
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administration of funds derived by way of fees or assessments from attorneys (Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, Title
6); from banks (Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Title 7, Sees. 71-11 and 7-1-llx) and fr-om airplane pilots and companies (Rev. Stat. Utah 19·33, Title 4).
We shall now proceed to indicate t~he nature of the
taxing power for the purpose of distinguishing it from
the poli.ee power which requires payments to be made
into a special fund for a particular purpose: The line
which distinguishes an exercise of the police power from
the exercise of the taxing power is difficult to draw,
but notwithstanding these difficulties, there are criteria
available for determining whet1her a particular statute
falls on one side of the line or the other. In this connection, reference should be made to the discussion in
Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed. 1924, vol. 4, c. 29,
entitled "Impositions in Exercise of Police Power." On
page 3511 it is said:
"If the purpose is regulation the imposition ordinarily is an exer.cise of the police power, while
if the purpose is revenue the imposition is an exercise ·of the taxing power and is a tax.''

On page 3513 the author says:
"Only those cases where regulation is the primary
purpose can be specially referred to the police
power. If revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental the imposition is
a tax; while if regulation is the primary purpose
the mere fact that incidentally a revenue is also
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obtained does not make the imposition a tax,

* *"
In support of this statement the author cites State ex rel.
Brewster v. Ross, 101 Kan. 377, 166 P. 505; Davis v.
Hailey, 143 Tenn. 247, 227 S. W. 1021; Ard. v. People, 66
Colo. 480, 182 P. 892; Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420,
440, 117 S. W. 508 and other cases. In the Rhinehart case,
it was decided that a "tax" of one-fifth of 1 per cent. on
the gross premiums ,of fire insurance companies to provide a fund for investigation by the insurance commissioner of the origin ·Of fires is not a "tax" although the
surplus of ·such monies is paid into the State Treasury
and expended for general State purposes. See also Rell-

foot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 171, 36 S.
W.1046.
On page 3514 Cooley writes:
"If, by the common understanding and general
custom of the country, a particular duty is regarded as being imposed upon certain individuals,
not as their pvoportionate share in the burdens of
government, but because of some special relation
to property peculiarly located, or to business peculiarly troublesome or dangerous, s•o that a requirement H1at the duty shall be performed by
such individuals is usually regarded as only in the
nature of regulation of relative obligations and
duties through the neighborhood or the municipality, there is no sufficient reason why this may
not be considered a mere police regulation, though
the proceedings assume the form of taxation, and
are even designated by that name." (Italics Supplied).
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We do not believe that it is possible to argue t~hat the
purpose of the unemployment compensation law is ''revenue'' or that revenue is the primary purpose of the law
and regulation is merely incidental. The statute is declared in section 2 to be enacted under the police powers
of the State and sets forth an unemployment compensation system which is self-financing in all respects insofar
as the public funds of the State are concerned. It provides for an unemployment compensation fund "whi~h
shall be administered separate and apart from all public
monies or funds of the State" (section 9 (a)) and "which
is to be administered by the State Treasurer, not in his
regular .capacity, but as ex-officio Treasurer and custodian." (section 9(c) (4) ). The fund consists of all
contributions collected under the act and the Industrial
Commission is vested with full power, authority and
jurisdictiton over the fund (section 9'( a)). Contributions
are deposited in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund
(section 9'(c) (4)) and requisitioned therefrom by the
Industrial Commission (through the Treasurer acting as
its fiscal agent) from time to time in such amounts as it
deems necessary for anticipated benefit payments. When
requisitioned such monies are required to be deposited
in the unemployment compensation fund in a special
benefit account and benefits are to be paid therefrom in
accordance with such regulations as the Industrial Commission may prescribe (section 9(d) ). It is apparent
that the system of collection and the payment of benefits
contemplated by the legislature differs fundamentally
and radically from that set up by statute for the collec-
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tion of general taxes. See Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts
Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra, p. 728;
see als·o Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Titles 4, 6, 7, 30, 42 and 79
providing for t!he collection of fees from airplane pilots,
attorneys, banks, from anglers, hunters, occupations generally, and employers for insuring under the Workmen's
Compensation Law.

It is especially significant that, by statute, (section
9(a) ), and, in practice, the contributions collected never
become a part of nor are they ever mingled with the public funds of the State in its Treasury which are available
for defraying the general expenses of Government. The
contributions are deposited in special acoounts and are
treated as special monies impressed with a trust in favor
of those persons who may qualify under the criteria set
forth in t•he statute as unemployed individuals entitled
to benefits.

This is important because it is generally

re.cognized that the •outstanding characteristic of a tax,
and that feature which distinguishes it from a levy under
the police power, is that a tax is a compulsory exaction
to defray the general expenses of government. State ex

rel. Davis-Smith Co. v Clausen, 65 W,ash. 156, 117 P.
1101; First State Bank of Claremont v. Smith, 49 S. D.
518,207 N. W. 467, 469; Home Accident Insurance Co. v.
Ind. Comm. of Ariz., 34 Ariz. 201, 269 P. 501. See particularly State ex rel. Attorney General v. Wisconsin Con-

structors, (Wis.1936), 268 N. W. 238,242, 243; 26 R. 0. L.
17, et seq.
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Contributions, however, are not available for that
purpose. Indeed, if they were available for any purpose
other than the payment of unemployment benefits, the
unemployment compensation law would not be in conformity with section 303(a) (5)* of the Federal Social
Security Act as amended, and se-ction 1603(a) (4)* of the
Internal Revenue Code (formerly section 903(a) (4) of
the Sodal Security Act). Such lack of conformity with
the standards in the cited provisiQns would result in a
deprivation to taxpayers of the credit against the Federal
tax to which they would otherwise he entitled upon the
payment of State contributions, and would deprive the
State of Utah of federal funds f.or the administration of
the unemployment compensation law-a consequence
which would mean complete frustration and nullification
of the legislative intention expressed in the Utah unemployment compensati·on law.
Moreover, the statute, section 7 (f) of Chapter 43,
Session Laws of 1937, and section 7 (e) of Chapter 52,
Session Laws of 1939, clearly shows that the legislature
did not regard contributi·ons to be taxes levied under the
taxing power of the state. These se.ctions provide that
"contributions paid by an employer

*

*

*

shall be

deductible in arriving at taxable income of such employer
under the provisions of Chapters 13 and 14, Title 80, Re*These sections require all State unemployment compensation laws,
as a condition of approval for tax credits under the Federal Unemployment Taxing Act and for administrative grants to provide for"Expenditure of all money requisiti-oned by the State agency from
the Unemployment Trust Fund, in the payment of unemployment
compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration; • • *"

31
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended, to the same
extent as other taxes deductible during any taxable year
by any such employer." Under Title 80, Ohapters 13 and
14 of the Revised Statutes, aU taxes payable under taxing laws are permissible deductions with named exceptions. If the legislature had regarded contributions to
be taxes levied under a taxing law, this provision in the
unemployment compensation law would have been unnecessary. The contributions would have constituted
permissible deductions without specific provision being
made for their deductibility in the unemployment compensation law. The insertion of this section clearly indicates, therefore, that t!he legislature did not view contributions to be taxes and accordingly, in •order to permit their deduction under the income tax law, inserted
the provision in the law that contributions might be deducted from gross income under the income tax law not
"as taxes" but merely "to the same extent" as taxes.
The argument that enforced payments may be referrable to the police power and not to the power of taxation, and, therefore, not ''taxes'' is not novel. The field
of workmen's compensation furnishes an analogy which
may be the most persuasive in its support. Workmen'•s
compensation laws have been held to represent exercises
of a power other than the taxing power of a State because, like the State unemployment compensat~on law,
the monies they require to be paid into State funds or
to be paid by way of premium for ~compulsory insurance
are not raised for general revenue nor f·or the miscellaneous expenses of State Government, but for a part-

3.2

ieular purpose within the regulatory powers of the State.
It has been well established that workmen's compensation laws stem fflom t·he police power. See State ex rel.
Da.vis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101;
Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont.
180, 119 Pac. 554; Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal
Co., 175 Ia. 245, 154 N. ·w. 1037; Home Accident Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 34 Ariz.
201, 269 Pac. 501; State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N. D.
619, 175 N. W. 714. In State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v.

Clausen, supra, the court said (p. 1116.) :
"The third principal objection to the constitutionality of the act is that it violates the provisions
of the Constitution designed to secure equal and
uniform taxation of property for public purposes.
As the charge laid on the pers,ons engaged in the
industries named in the ad is a pecuniary burden
imposed by public authority, it partakes of the
nature of a tax and, in the language of a distinguished judge discussing a similar question, 'for
many purposes might be so spoken of without
harm.' Bu;t it is manifest that it is not a 'tax' in
the sense the umrd is used in the sections of the
Constitu.tion to W'hva,h reference. is here made.
No accession to the public revenue, general or
local, is authorized or aimed at. The purpose of
the exaction is entirely different. It is to be used,
not to meet the current expenses of government,
but to recompense employes of the industries on
whom the burden is imposed for injuries received
by them while engaged in the pursuit of their employment. It is the consideration which the owners of t!he industries pay f,or the privilege of carrying them on. It is therefore in the nature of a
license tax, and ean be justified on the principle

33
of law that justifies the imposition and collection
of license taxes generally." (Italics supplied).
In State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, supra, the court
said (p. 716):
"It is perfectly clear that the workmen's compensation fund is no part of the state fund, and is,
in no sense public money. It is a special fund,
accumulated by the collection of annual premiums
from employers, the amount of which is determined and fixed by the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau for the empl·oyment or occupation operated by such employer, * * * When the fund
is accumulated, the state treasury is by the provisions of the act, made the custodian of it. The
Legislature, if it had thought it wise, could have
designated the Commissioner of Agriculture and
Labor, or the Commissioner of Insurance, or other
public officer, as custodian of the fund. It might,
perhaps, if it deemed it wise, ,have designated a
trust company or responsible banking institution,
or any other responsible financial agency within
the state as custodian; this upon the gr•ounds that
such funds are not public funds, but is a special
fund, and in a sense a private fund as contradistinguished from a public fund in the sense that
it is collected from not all the people of the state
by ·way of taxation, but from certain individuals,
corporations, associ ations, etc., of the state engaged in conducting certain occupations and employments denominated in the act. The purpose
of the collection of the same into a special fund is
to compensate f,or a definite length of time, depending on the character of the injury, employes
who re.ceived injuries while engaged in such employment, for employers who have paid the premiums assessed against them into such fund."
1
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Nor are workmen's compensation laws the ·only laws compelling the payment of contributions into a fund for a
proper public purpose referrable to the police power of
the State. In McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S.
W. 688 ( 1908) a "per capita tax" was levied on dogs to
indemnify individuals who suffered losses of sheep due
to the depredat1ons of dogs. The obvious purpose of the
act was to promote the sheep industry. After pointing
out that the regulation of dogs was an appropriate subject of regulation under the police power the court said
(p. 690):
"We are also of the opini,on that, the statute not
being for revenue but an exercise of the police
power, its provisions are not regulated by any
section of t~he Constitution relating to fiscal matters, and, although the sum required to be paid
by the owner of each dog four months old is called
a tax, and it is required to be assessed by the
assessor, oollected by the sheriff and paid over
to the State Treasurer, this is only a mode of
regulating the dogs within the state and protecting the sheep industry."
In Fire Department of Milwaukee v. II elfenstein, 16
Wis. 142, the statute provided that no person could operate within the State as an agent of a fire insurance company until he had filed a bond conditi,oned on the payment of $2 for every $100 of premiums annually collected. The court held that the statute did not infringe
the constitutional requirement that taxes should be uniform and said (p. 145) :
''Nor is the requirement an exercise of t~he power of taxation as to the companies, but only a
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proper exercise of the police power inherent m
the sovereignty of the state."
See Smith v. Commonweal~h, 175 Ky. 286, 1941S. W. 367;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; State ex rel. Sherman v. Pape, 103 Wash. 319, 174 Pac. 468; Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104; State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn.
312. See also First State Bank of Sutherlin v. Kendall
Lumber Corporation, 107 Ore. 1, 213 Pac. 142, in which
it was held that an Oregon law requiring timber land
owners to provide a fire patrol and authorizing the !State
forester in the event of their failure to do so to provide
a patrol and to charge the expenses thereof against the
lands protected, was not a taxing statute and is therefore not invalid as failing to provide for a uniform and
equal rate ·of taxation required by t•he Constitution.
The above cases are referred to principally for the
purpose of demonstrating that workmen's compensation
statutes and others which provide for the compulsory
payment of money to a fund for some purpose within the
scope of regulatory or police powers, are not by reason
thereof "taxing" statutes except in the most general
and non-technical sense of the term. A "contribution",
"fee", or "assessment" either to a fund or private association is frequently referred to as a tax although in
contemplation of law it has an entirely different eharacter.
In Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N. D. 603, 200 N. W. 524, the
court said that .contributions to a State fund for workmen's oornpensation is a "species of taxation", but the
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exaction was sustained under the police power. In State
ex rel. Da1vis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, supra, the court said
with reference to the objection that the workmen's compensation law of Washington violated pr•ovisions of the
Constitution designed to secure equal and uniform taxation of property for public purposes:
''As the charge laid on the pers•ons engaged in the
industries named in the act is a pecuniary burden
imposed by public authority, it partakes of the
nature of a tax and, in the language of a distinguished judge discussing a similar question, 'for
many purposes may be so spoken of without
harm'. But it is manifest that it is not a 'tax' in
the sense the word is used in the sections of the
Constitution to which reference is here made.''
To sum up, briefly: In referring to "tax laws",
Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution eonfers
jurisdiction upon the State Tax Commission with respect
t•o all revenue laws enacted in pursuance of the State's
power ·of taxation; the unemployment compensation law
is not such a law; it does not contemplate the collection
of revenue to defray the general expenses of government-to the contrary it reveals its police power origin
as stated in section 2 of the law, by attempting to regulate the evils of unemployment by means of the collecti-on of funds from those who stand in a proximate position to the problem, the deposit of such funds in a special
account in accordanee with procedures which differ radically from those applicable to general revenue receipts,
and the payment of such funds to qualified individuals.
The entire scheme of the law manifests a legislative un-
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derstanding that the c•ontributions are not to be regarded
as taxes in the technical sense, but police power exactions
levied by a statute which is not a "tax law" within the
constitutional provisions.
The court is also respectfully referred to the widely
accepted canon of statutory 0onstruction t!hat where a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of
which will uphold its validity and another which will
render it unconstitutional, the court should favor that
construction which will result in sustaining the statute.
See The Best Foods Co. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285
Pac. 1001, 1004, and particularly, the cases cited at that
page. See also State v. Packer Corp., 77 Uta1h 500, 297
Pac. 1013; Utah State Fair Association v. Green, 68 Utah
251, 249 Pac. 1016; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83
Utah 321, 28 P. (2d) 161, 167; Tintic Standard Minmg
Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 16 P. (2d) 637; Salter
v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061; 25 R. C. L., p.
100, et seq., sections 243, 244, 245.
Thus, where the unemployment compensation law
may be upheld as an exercise of the police power (as
was stated by this court in its previous decision in this
case), (and as is stated by the legislature in its declaration of purpose in enacting the law), and might also be
referrable to t1he taxing power of the State, the court
should not hold the statute unconstitutional, or the action of the Industrial Commission invalid on the theory
that t_he statute is a" tax law'' where a holding that the
statute was enacted in pursuance of the police power,
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and is not a taxing law, would result in an affirmance
of the administrative action and the validity of the statute.
C. Doubts t!hat might arise concerning the confmmity of the State unemployment compensation law
with the standards of Title III of the Social Security Act should induce the court to sustain the
authority ·of the Industrial Commission to determine the existence of the employer relationship.
The Utah unemployment compensation law, in common with the laws of other States approved by t•he Social
Security Board under Title IX ·of the Social Security
Act and financed as to their administration by grants of
Federal monies under Title III of that act, sets up a
procedure for determination by an administrative agency
of the rights of claimants to benefits under the law. It
provides, in connecti·on with such procedure, for a fair
hearing to be afforded to individuals whose claims for
benefits are denied. If the Industrial Commission is not
permitted to decide issues of "employment" in connecti·on with claims for benefits, serious doubt would exist
with respect to the .conformity of the :State law with the
provisions of Title III of the Social Security Act.
Section 303(a) (3) of that Act requires, as a condition of Federal grants, that the State law pr•ovide:
"Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims
for unemployment compensation are denied."
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This pr·ovision has been construed, in the standards of
the Social Security Board with respect thereto, to require that the State statute and rules and regulations
thereunder include provision for a fair hearing before an
administrative tribunal; opportunity for a fair hearing
only upon appeal to a judicial tribunal is deemed inadequate to sa.tisfy the standard. Hence, to conform with
this section of the So.cial Security Act, an administrative tribunal must afford a full and fair hearing to all
individuals whose claims are denied on all issues relevant
to the validity of their claims. Section 6(c) of the unemployment compensation law and the regulations of the
Industrial Commission (Regulations 20-1 through 204), have been accepted by the Social (Security Board as
conforming with all the essential elements of the type
of fair hearing contemplated by section 303(a) (3) of the
Social Security Act. The jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission, under the law as found by the Social Se.curity Board to conform with the requirements of section
303(a) (3), must extend, to determinations of questions
of empl·oyment if it is to afford to a claimant an opportunity for a fair hearing in cases where the payment of
benefits depends upon the resolution of the "employment" question. A hearing on this issue must, under
the requirements of the Social Security Act, be afforded
regardless whether it may or may not have been adjudicated for the purpose of contribution liability in a suit
for contributions brought by the State Tax Commission.
The fair hearing provision in secti·on 303(a) (3) of
the Social Security Act was obviously intended as a
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guaranty to those who assert claims for benefits. Such
hearings must be afforded with respect to all issues inv-olving the payment or denial of benefits. Unless it is
held that the Industrial Commission •Can hold hearings
to determine such a question, i.e., whether an individual
earned wages in employment in the amount specified by
the Btate law, in all cases where such issue is disputed
in connection with a claim for benefits, serious doubt as
to the conformity ·of the State law with the provisions of
section 303 (a) ( 3) of the Social Security Act exists.
Contrary to the assertions made by amici curiae t>hat
in all instances the existence of an employment relationship has been determined in suits for contribut1ons, the
attention of this court is called to the following cases
in which coverage issues including the issue of ''employment" have been adjudicated in appeal proceedings which
arose out ·of claims for benefits. Bronx H omc News v.
Miller, (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55; In rc Batter,
(N.Y. 1939), 14 N.Y. S. (2d) 42; In re Kinney, (N.Y.
1939), 14 N.Y. S. (2d) 11; Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Ramsey, et al., Prentice-Hall, Unemployment Compensation
Service, Wisconsin, ~ 29624. That the number of judicial decisions on coverage questions which •have been
rendered in proceedings arising fvom claims for benefits
is relatively small as .c•ompared with the number rendered
in suits for contributions is easily accounted for.

No

benefits became payable under any State unemployment
compensation law until two years after contributions
were payable under the law ·of the State, and except in
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-Wisconsin, no benefits became payable under any law
until 1938. ( Cf. section 903 (a) ( 2) of the Social Security
Act, now section 1603(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which requires an accumulation of funds for a twoyear period under !State unempl·oyment oompensation
laws before benefits might become payable.) The attention of the court is again directed to the provisions of
the unemployment compensation laws of every State and
Territ·ory setting up provisions for administrative determinations of benefit rights and to the already large volume of benefit decisions rendered by t!he administrative
appeal tribunals which have involved coverage questions.
(Selections from these decisions have been printed by
the Social Security Board in the "Unempl·oyment Compensation Interpretative Service-Benefit Series", a
compilation of the benefit decisions of the higher administrative appeal tribunals.) The provisions for determination of benefit rights through a system of administrative
tribunals, ·with limited provision for appeal to the courts,
are designed to facilitate t•.he speedy determination of
benefit rights in a manner which would not be possible if
all issues pertinent theret·o had to be resolved by judicial proceedings. ( Cf. Statement of this Court in Utah

Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P.
122, 123, and 124). If such provisions accomplish their
purpo_se it is to be expected that questi·ons of covered employment will, in connection with decisions upon individual benefit rights, be generally decided by administrative tribunals.
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Section 303(a) (1) requires that a State law, to be
eligible for grants of Federal funds for its administration, must provide:
"Such methods of administration (other than
those relating to selection, tenure of office, and
compensation of personnel) as are found by the
Board to be reasonably calculated to insure full
payment ·of unemployment ·compensation when
due.''
This provision appears to have as its purpose to insure
that S1tate laws .certified for Federal grants shall contain
provisions calculated to assure a prompt disposition of
claims fm benefits and the payment of benefits in accordance therewith. An unemployment compensation law
which would permit delay in any payment until another
agency of the State government, not charged with responsibility for the payment of benefits W!hen due, should
decide for tax collecti·on purposes to press to ultimate
conclusion in the courts the legal issue of the existence
of the employment relationship would fail of its purpose
because it would not pr·ovide benefits to unemployed
workers at the time when they are most needed; such a
law eould only very questionably be regarded as one containing provisions for methods of administration calculated to assure the full payment of benefits when due.

It_ is submitted that in view of the doubts that might
arise concerning the conformity of the State unemployment compensati.on law with Title III of the Social Security Act should the arguments of amici curiae prevail,
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this court should be inclined to adopt such a construction of the State law as would insure the continued conformity .of the law with the Federal Social Security Act.
D. The court should sustain the Industrial Commission's order insofar as it affects the payment of
benefits to the claimant, Thomas, and insofar as
it determines that he was engaged in "employment'' even if it be held that the portion of the
Commission's decision which requires the employer to file reports and pay contributions is
invalid.
In point II A, supra, we demonstrated that the authority to administer the unemployment compensation
law, generally, has been conferred by the legislature upon the Industrial Commission, and that the Commission
is burdened with the duty of determining the eligibility
of claimants for benefits and the amount of benefits payable to them. In the c.ourse of making such determinations, the Industrial Commission is under the duty of
determining whether a claimant ''earned wages for employment by employers" in a specified amount (section
4(e) ).
The brief of amici .curiae seems to argue that if the
Industrial Commission's decis1on requiring Globe Grain
and Milling Company to file reports and to pay contributions is invalid, that by reason thereof, t~he portion of
the decision adjudicating the claimant's eligibility for
benefits and the amount thereof is also invalid.

In so
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arguing, amici curiae proceed upon the assumption that
invalidity of a part of an order necessarily voids it in
i,ts entirety. While this might be the case where portions
·Of an order are inseparable and mutually dependent, the
assumption has no validity where the portions of an
order are distinct and separable.
T!here is no direct relationship between a right to
benefits by a claimant and the obligation of the employer
to pay oontributions. The two parts of the statute are
separate and distinct. A claimant may be entitled to benefits notwithstanding that no contributions had been or
will be paid by his employer if he meets the eligibility
conditions as set forth in section ( 4) which do not require
as a C·ondition to the receipt of benefits that an employer
shall have paid contributions. Likewise, an employer
might be liable for contributions without any of his employees ever asserting a claim for benefits or qualifying
therefor. Therefore, the alleged invalidity of the Commission's decision, insofar as it required Globe Grain
and Milling Co!lljpany to pay contributions, cannot affect that portion which adjudicated Thomas' claim for
benefits. In State ex rel. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 308 Mo. 359, 272 S. W.
9'57, a somewhat similar situation was involved. In that
case, the Supreme Court of the 1State of Missouri held,
after initial hearing, that under the Public Service Commissi·on Law, the State Public Service Commission had
no jurisdiction to construe and enforce a railroad's contract with Kansas City to construct and maintain a viaduct over railroad yards at its own expense. Subsequent-
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ly, on moti·on to modify the decree, it appeared that the
City sought only an affirmance of such portion of the
Commission's order as permitted the construction of a
viaduct •Over the railroad yards in accordance with pres·cribed specifications, leaving it to subsequent litigation
to determine whether, under the contract, the railroad
was obliged to assume the cost of erecti·on and expense
of maintenance. It was argued in oppositi·on that the
statute which authorized the Circuit Court to enter judgment "either affirming ·Or setting aside the order of the
Oommission" did not "permit of a partial affirmance
or reversal." The c.ourt held, however, that "there was
nothing relating to the apportionment of costs that could
have been pr01perly eonsidered by t·he Commission m
determining the manner ·of crossing'' and that:
''As the manner of crossing, as determined and
prescribed, was, and is in no way dependent upon
the apportionment of costs, the order under review can be set aside as to the latter without in
any way affecting or modifying it in resped to
the f•ormer." (p. 963)
The court, in this case can, theref.ore, take the same action as was taken by the Supreme Court of the State of
Missouri. It can uphold the order of the Industrial Commission with respect to the remedial action of awarding
benefits to the claimant, leaving it to subsequent litigation (such as a suit for contributions which may be instituted by the State Tax Commission) to determine how
the cost to the State unemployment fund of the benefit
payments is to be borne.
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Thus, even if contributions be deemed to be "·taxes"
and the unemployment compensation law, to the extent
that it requires tJhe payment of contributions, be considered a" tax law" which, under the Constitution, must
be administered by the State Tax Commission, it is clear
that, to the extent benefits are paid and the Industrial
Commissi·on is required to make determinations of the
existence of "ellll)ployme'rlt" for benefit purposes, its
orders must be sustained. The mere fact that both the
State Tax Commission and the Industrial Commission,
independently, might be called upon to make determinations as to the existence of "employment" (one for the
purpose of contributions and tJhe other for the purpose
of benefits) does not mean that an invalid portion of an
·Order of the Industrial Oommission adjudicating ''tax
liability" is inseparable from a portion adjudicating
benefit rights, nor that its invalidity taints that portion
of the ·order which the Industrial Commission is clearly
authorized to issue. Compare Fuqua v. Watson, et al.,
172 Okla. 624, 46 P. (2d) 486; Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co.
v. Forrester, 72 Okla. 8, 177 P. 593; Ballew v. United
Sltates, 160 U. S. 187.

III.
THE DENIAL BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF GLOBE
GRAIN AND MILLING COMPANY'S APPLICATION FOU A
REVUJW OF THE DECISION OF THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
WAS PROPE:R.

In its petition for rehearing, Globe Grain & Milling
Company alleges that error was -committed in that the

47
"appeal" before the Industrial Commission was determined without hearing or argument other than that had
before the appeal tribunal ( Oon:~;pany 's petition for rehearing, pp. 2, 3). This contention, not having been
properly raised by the company on its original petition
for a review of the decisi,on of the Industrial Commission, cannot be considered upon the application f.or rehearing. Pingree National Bank v. Weber Coun,ty, 54
Utah 599, 183 P. 334, 336; Dahlquist v. Denver a~Ytd R. G.
Ry. Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833, 844.
But even if it were properly in issue, this contention
lacks merit. It assumes that there is some constitutional
necessity for a hearing before the Industrial Commission as well as befme the appeal tribunal prior to appeal
to the courts. The only constitutional provision which
might have any bearing upon this claim would seem to
be the "due process" provisions of the State and Federal Constitution. It is submitted, however, that although judicial review may be required of certain types
of administrative action, an appeal is not a part of due
process of law in either judicial or administrative proceedings. Pittsburgh C. C. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S.
421; James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129; United States v.
Heintz, 218 U. S. 532; Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N.
E. 119; 6 R. C. L. p. 454. See Morgan v. United States,
304 U. S. 1; Consolidated Edison v. National Labor Re-

lations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 224-228.
In Pittsburgh C. C. Ry. Co. v. Backus, supra, the
United States Supreme Court, in holding that an ad-

48

ministrative appeal was not essential to due process of
law, said (p. 426) :
"It is urged that the valuation as fixed was not
announced until shortly before the adjournment
,of the board, and that no notice was given of such
valuation in time to take any steps for the correction of errors therein. If by this we are to
understand counsel as claiming that there must
be notice and a hearing after the determination
by the assessing hoard as well as before, we are
unable to concur with that view. A hearing before judgment, with full opportunity to present
all the evidence and the arguments which the
party deems important, is all that can be adjudged vital. Rehearings, new trials, are not essential to due process of law, either in judicial
or administrative proceedings. One hearing, if
ample, before judgment, satisfies the demand of
the Constitution in this respect.''
An administrative appeal not being essential to due
process of law, the only other question which remains
for consideration is whether such an appeal is required
by the terms of the unemployment compensation law.
Section 6 of the unemployment compensation law, outlines the procedure to be followed by the Industrial
Commission and its representatives in passing on the
validity of claims for benefits. Under this section, provision was made by the legislature for a number of stages
in the administrative determination of claims, and it is
submitted that all the prescribed steps called for by the
law were adhered to by the Industrial Commiss~on and
its representatives in considering the issues involved in
the application for benefits.
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According to the provisions of section 6(b), immediately following the filing of a claim for benefits, an
initial determination ,of its validity must be made. This
determination, except in cases which involve labor dispute issues, may be made in one of two ways. The
claim may be passed upon by a representative or deputy
designated by the Commission to perform that function,
or, if the deputy or the representative, in his discretion,
decides not to make an initial determination on the claim
but to refer it for decision to an appeal tribunal, by an
appeal tribunal consisting of either a three-member body
or a single salaried examiner (section 6 (b)). In this
case, the deputy designated by the Industrial Commission, after examining the facts before him, made an
initial determination. He concluded that Thomas, the
claimant, was ineligible to receive benefits under the
terms of the law. From this determination, Thomas
appealed to the appeal tribunal which, after affording
to Thomas and Globe Grain and Milling Company a full
hearing on all disputed issues, reversed the initial determination and awarded benefits.

An application for a

review of this decision awarding benefits was thereupon
filed with the Industrial Commission by Globe Grain and
Milling Company.

The Industrial Commission denied

the company's application for review and affirmed the
decision of the appeal tribunal, and in doing so without
allowing a further hearing of the claim, it is submitted,
the Industrial Commission acted fully in accordance with
the provisions of the law.
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Under the law, a decision <of an appeal tribunal is
the decision of the Industrial Commission unless reviewed by the Commission (section 6 (c)). It is not the
decision of a subordinate body or of a mere investigator.
According t,o the language of the statute, further hearings on a claim may be had before the Industrial Commission as a matter of right only by a party to a decision
of an appeal tribunal which was not unanimous, or by
a deputy or representative of the Commission whose
decision was overruled or modified by an appeal tribunal.
In all other situations, a further hearing on a claim
decided by an appeal tribunal may not be had unless the
Industrial Commission, on its own initiative, directs a
further hearing, or if it grants a hearing upon application by a party to the decision of the appeal tribunal
(section 6 (e) ) .
The Industrial Commission in this case was not required by the statute to further review the claim. The
decision of the appeal tribunal being the decision of the
Industrial Commission under the statute, the company's
petition for review amounted to nothing more than an
application for a rehearing of the claim. Such reconsideration could not have been had in this case before the
Industrial Commission unless it granted the company's
application therefor. This, the Industrial Commission
refused to do, and its action in that regard cannot be
held to be erroneous since it was fully empowered by
the legislature to use its discretion as to whether it
should grant or deny such reconsideration of claims
in all but two types of situations, neither <Of which ob-
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tained in this instance. Nor was it error for the Industrial Commission to deny the company's application for
a reconsideration of the decision made for it by the appeal tribunal without affording the company an opportunity to argue the merits of the case, orally or otherwise, prior to the Commission acting upon the application. Pinyon Queen Mining Co., et al. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323.
In the Pinyon Queen Mining Company case, the company sought to review in court an award of workmen's
compensation to one of its employees. Following the
award of compensation, the State applied for a rehearing before the Industrial Commission. The rehearing
was granted and the award was affirmed. On certiorari
to the court, the company argued that the award should
be vacated because the application for rehearing had not
been served upon it and because it had not been afforded
an opportunity to be heard with respect to the application. The court rejected this contention and, in holding
that an opportunity to be heard in connection with an
application for a rehearing was unnecessary, said (p.
324):
''So far as applications for rehearing are concerned, it would be a useless and cumbersome
proceeding to have the parties appear for a special hearing on the motion for rehearing. There
is no formal hearing on a motion for rehearing,
and when a petition for rehearing is pending
it is properly disposed of ex parte."
The facts in this case are even stronger than those
involved in the Pinyon Queen Mining Company case.
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Here it was the Globe Grain and Milling Company which
filed the application for rehearing. It had an opportunity to state its grounds for dissatisfaction with the
appeal tribunal's decision in its applicati,on and if an
opportunity to be heard with respect thereto were required, it is the claimant who would have been entitled
to the opportunity to argue before the Industrial CommiSSIOn.

But even if it is assumed that the action of the
Industrial Commissi,on, in passing upon Globe Grain and
Milling Company's application to annul the decision
of the appeal tribunal, amounted to a review of the
proceedings before that tribunal and an affirmance of
the decision of the appeal tribunal, the Industrial Commission was not required under the statute t,o afford
the claimant an opportunity to be heard before confirming the decision of the appeal tribunal. The unemployment compensation law provides that in the conduct of
hearings, the Industrial Commission shall not be bound
by "common law or statutory rules of evidence and
other technical rules of procedure." (section 6(f) ). And,
theref,ore, the rules which ordinarily govern the conduct
of cases in court do not apply to hearings before the
Industrial Commission. Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; McDonald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 120
Me. 52, 112 Atl. 719.
The statute, in terms, authorizes the Industrial
Commission to review and decide claims for benefits on
"the basis of the evidence previously submitted'' in a
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case or to permit the taking of additional evidence
(section 6(e)). It would seem that the statute, therefore, not only vests in the Industrial Commission discretion with respect to allowing a review of decisions
of appeal tribunals, but also as to the manner, form,
and extent of the review. Review in the first instance
being discretionary, it is also discretionary with the Industrial Commission as to whether in reviewing a claim
on the basis of records previously made, it should give
the parties notice of such review and afford them opportunity to be heard thereon prior to reviewing the case.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in

Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. State Indu,strial Commission,
149 Okla. 162, 299 P. 180, 184, supports this view.

In

this caso, the court ruled that the power of the Oklahoma
Industrial Commission to review a workmen's compensation award and to set it aside upon petition of a party
was not defeated by the failure to give notice of the filing
of the petition and affording the parties an opportunity
to argue the claim.

In that situation the statute, like

the statute in this case, did not, in terms, require such
notice and hearing to be given.

Whether the Commis-

sion should grant review at all was discretionary, and
therefme, in the absence of a statutory requirement for
notice and hearing in connection with reviewing determinations of appeal tribunals, the Commission had the
authority to dispense with such notice and hearing. See

Derr v. Weaver, 173 Okla. 140, 29 P. (2d) 97, 99.
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IV.
THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT EMPLOYMENT UNDER
THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW IS BROADER
THAN THE COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP.

A. The legislative history, language and plan of
of the statute clearly contemplate coverage under the law broader in ~scope than the traditi,onal
common law relationship of master and servant.
The unemployment compensation law as originally
enacted by the legislature in 1936 (Laws of Utah, Sp.
Sess. 1936 Ch. 1) defined ''employment'' in Section 19
(g) thereof in the following terms:
"Employment means service, including service
in interstate commerce, performed for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, which service (1) is performed
in this state by an individual, exclusive, however, of any service within this state which is
incidental to the individual's service performed
elsewhere; or (2) is performed elsewhere but is
incidental to an individual's service in this state;

* * *"
Under this definition it might have been argued that
coverage under the law was not defined in precise terms
and it might have been urged that it alluded to the
traditi,onal common law master-servant relationship. See
Texas Company v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 880.
But the legislature of this state, in 1937, felt impelled
to change this definition; to ascribe to the term "em-
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ployment" a more precise meaning, and to give it the
scope it intended it to have, namely, to cover thereunder
persons other than those servants under 0ommon law
concepts. Accordingly, in Session Laws of 1937 Ch. 43,
Section 19 (j), it re-defined "employment" as "service,
including service in interstate commerce, performed for
wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied" and, very significantly, added the
provision that, regardless whether the relationship between an individual and the unit for which services
were performed was that of master and servant or principal and independent contractor, all services performed
for wages shall constitute "employment" unless the
circumstances under which the services were performed
met three named conditions for exclusion. The provision
thus added reads (Section 19 (j) ( 5)) :
''Services performed by an individual for wages
shall be deemed to be employment subject to this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commission that" (a) Such individual has been and will continue
to be free fr,om control or direction over
the performance of such ·services, both under
his contract of service and in fact; and
''(b) Such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for which such service
is performed or that such service is performed 'outside of all the places of business
of the enterprise for which such service is
performed; and
'' (c) Such individual is customarily engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business.''
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This change in the definition of employment obviously flowed from a change in intent, and a comparison
of the definition as written by the legislature shows
that it adopted, for the purpose of determining coverage
under the unemployment compensation law, standards
which were wholly unlike those used to determine employment under traditional common law master and
servant concepts.
The common law approach is outlined by the Restatement of the Law of Agency in Section 220, chapter VII,
topic 2, title B of Volume I. It reads:
"b. Generality of definition. The relationship
of master and servant is one not capable of
exact definition. It is an important relationship in that upon it depends the liability of
the master to third persons and to his employees under the provisions of various statutes as well as under the common law; tho
relationship may prevent liability, as in the
case of the fellow servant rule. It cawzot
be defined, however, in general terms with
s1tbstantial accuracy. The factors stated in
Subsection (2) are all considered in determining the question, and it is for the triers of
fact to determine whether or not there is a
sufficient group of favorable factors to establish the relationship. Where tho inference is clear that there is, tor is not, a master
and servant relationship, it is made by the
court; otherwise the jury determines the
question after instruction by the court as to
the matters of fact to be considered.'' (Italics
supplied).

Under the common law approach to the master and servant relationship, the triers of facts must determine
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"whether or not there is a sufficient group of favorable
factors to establish the relationship" of master and
servant as distinguished from that of principal and independent contractor. The Restatement lists nine such
factors, which among others, are considered important
and which must be "weighed". These are:
" (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
the details of the work;
''(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged
in a distinct occupation or business;
"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer
or by a specialist without supervision;
" (d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
'' (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the
work;
"(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
"(g) the method of payment, whether by time
or by the job;
"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; and
"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of master and
servant."
But this process of choosing and weighing "factors"
is not the method of determining coverage under the
unemployment compensation law. The statute specifies
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only three criteria to be considered and a determination
that a relationship does not conform to any single one
of these is sufficient to create statutory "employment".
Common law tests thus become irrelevant under the
legislative definition, and such factors as are generally
used to determine relationships at common law, i. e.,
whether or not the parties intended that an "independent contractor" relationship flow from their action, the
method of payment whether by the time or job, the kind
of occupation and the customs of the locality, cannot
outweigh the statutory criteria. See Unemployment
Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 215 N. Car. 479, 2 S. E.
(2d) 584; Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Northwestern Mut~tal Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88
P. (2d) 560.
Whatever doubt might exist as to whether or not
the legislature intended to adopt a definition of "employment" unlike the common law master and servant
relationship and to discard that relationship as the scope
of coverage under the unemployment compensation law
is dispelled by the rejection of the Senate at the 1939
session of the legislature ·of all efforts to amend the
definition of employment so ~s to confine coverage
under the law to the traditional master and servant relationship. The following appears on page 5 of the 1939
Senate Journal, Day 52:
"Further oonsideration of S. B. No. 83 on second
reading. Senator McFarland moved to amend the
bill as follows:
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"Page 28, line 16 (referring to section 19(i) (1),
f,ollowing subdivision (6) insert subdivisions as
follows:
" '(7) Any employing unit which has in its employment under such conditions as to amount to
a relationship of master and servant and not
that of independent contractor of four or more
individuals, irrespective of whether the same individuals are or were employed in each such day.'
"Page 28, line 28 (referring to sections 19(j) (2)
(b)) following subdivision (2) (b) insert subdivision (c) as follows:
'' ' (c) The employment is not performed under
a contract which creates a relationship of independent contractor or does not amount to a relationship of master and servant.'
"Page 29, line 10 (referring to section 19(j)(5))
strike all of Section 5 and subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c), ending on line 22, page 29, and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
" '(5) Services performed by an individual for
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject
to the act when it is shown that the services were
performed under such conditions as amount to
a. relationship of master and servant and not that
of independent contractor.'
"Page 30, line 17 (referring to section 19(j) (6)
(i)) new subsection (i) as foUows:
" '(i) Services performed under a contract
which does not create the relationship of master
and servant or which are performed under a contract or condition which give rise to a relationship
of one doing services of an independent contractor or services here performed under a special
contract under such conditions that the person
performing the work performs it as an independent contrador.'
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"Page 31, line 13 (referring to section 19(p))
after the word 'payable' insert 'to an empl,oyee
and not to an independent contractor.'
"On motion of Sen a tor Hopkin a roll call was
ordered.
''The amendment failed to pass on the following
r'oll call:
"Yeas 8; Nays 11; absent 4."
This extract from tho legislative history of the definition of "employment" in the statute shows, free from
all doubt, that the legislature adopted a plan of coverage
broader in scope than the common law of master and
servant and that it wished t,o have coverage controlled
by the criteria it enumerated in Section 19 (j) ( 5) of the
law rather than by the tests generally used for determining the master-servant relationship at common law.
This view is further bolstered by the fact that all words
of art are carefully excluded from the enactment. Its
operative words are "employment", and "service",
and "employing unit", not "servant" "agent", or "independent contract·or", or "master", "principal", or
"contracting party". The traditional "control test" or
similar tests available to courts under the general body
of law when confronted with propositions surrounding
the concept of respondeat superior are wholly omitted
from this law, and although the Industrial Commission
has no quarrel with the value of the tests proposed in
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, as such, it should
be noted that the section relied upon by amici curiae to
bolster their argument that secti,on 19 ( j) ( 5) should be
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construed in the light of these tests, is ripped from its
context. Section 220 is taken from Chapter VII, Topic
2, Title B of Volume I of that work. The chapter is
entitled: Liability of Principal to Third Persons; Torts;
Topic 2 purports to discuss Liability for Authorized
Conduct or Conduct Incidental Thereto, and Title B
assumes to discuss the topic Torts of Servants. Moreover, not only does the Restatement thus point out that
the criteria in Section 220 are £or the purpose of determining ex delicto liabilities of a master rather than the
existence of a general employment relationship, but
the Restatement goes further and warns that the criteria
it enumerates do not and should not be substituted for
statutory definitions. On page 486 the Restatement contains the following cauti,onary remark:
"d. Statutory usc of scrva11t. Statutes have been
pa::-;secl in whieh the \vords 'servant' and
'agent' have been used. The meaning of
these words in statutes varies. The context
and purpose of the particular statute controls the meaning which is frequently not
that the same word bears in the Restatement
of this Subject.''
The authors of the Restatement ,of the Law of
Agency would probably be the last to urge that, in a
discussion of tort liability, they had finally established
not only a perfect concept of employment for all purposes, but also that, in enumerating the criteria set forth
therein, they had limited fm all time legislative power
in dealing with problems of employment. See "Interstate
Bards and Yale Reviewers", H. F. Goodrich (Advisor
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on Professional Relations to the American Law Institute) 84 U. of Penn. L. R. 449.
Before proceeding to an analysi.s of the criteria by
which the existence of the empLoyment relationship,
defined in the Unemployment Compensation Law, should
be determined, it should be noted that Section 19 (j) ( 5)
squares with the reasons underlying the enactment of
the unemployment compensation law. The general purpose of the unemployment compensati,on law is to alleviate the evils of unemployment. These objectives the
law is designed to achieve by the imposition of liability
for contributions to provide funds for benefits and by
adjustments in the rates ,of contributions as an incentive
to employers to stabilize employment. The basic risk
with which unemployment compensation is concerned is
the termination of the receipt of remuneration by persons performing services for others. Under our ec;onomy
this is the hazard which initiates the evils of unemployment. In enacting the unemployment compensation law,
the legislature, consistent with this purpose, could not
have concerned itself solely with the different and innumerable situations wherein the activities ·of one person
are controlled in .such detail by another as to warrant
the imposition of tort liability or some other liability
nor with the type of risk originally 0overed in employer's liability and in workmen's compensation laws. These
liabilities are imposed because the principal who has
authority to control and supervise the particular activities of his employee is obviously in a position to minimize the risk of injury by the installation of safety
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devices, or the imposition of strict rules and regulations
respecting operations. In such situations it might be
of importance whether the master could order a particular type of ~service or the kind of transportation to be
used. The existence of such control ,over the particular
details of the employee's activities or over the instrumentalities used by the servant justifies the determination that the master should bear the burden of injuries
resulting from such riskcs, and the absence of such control over the particular instrumentality or act which
caused an injury justifies freeing the employer fr,om
liability.
The risk of unemployment and the power to stabilize
employment, however, as distinguished from the risk of
injury to workmen or to a third person arises from
the dependence of an individual upon the continuance
of a relationship with the business of another. This
risk arises where the receipt of remuneration for services is dependent on the will of another or the continuance of a relationship with the business of another. It
is a risk which is not peculiar or restricted to individuals
within the traditional and technical common law relationship. It may not be minimized or augmented to the
same degree as other risks which can be minimized or
augmented by virtue of an employer's authority to control or supervise a particular detail of an employee's
activities. The risk of unemployment exists with respect
to all employment regardless of whether, in connection
with a particular tort or workmen's eompensation question, the relationship between the worker and his em-
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ployer is or is not such as to impose liability on the
master. The fact that an employee might choose his
means of travel or be completely in charge of a place of
business of his employer does not negative the fact that
unless he is a truly independent merchant or businessman, an entrepreneur in his own right, the continuation of his employment and his continued right to remuneration is dependent upon the will of another, or
the continuance of the business of another. The existence or non-existence of a technical master servant relationship under such circumstances is irrelevant and has
no realistic significance to the state whose concern it is
to pr,ovide means whereby persons temporarily unemployed can maintain their morale and their health until
they find jobs. These same considerations also apply
to the raising of funds to pay benefits. Equality of
treatment of business enterprises is related to the similarities between the general activities of the persons
through which enterprises are conducted. It is not related to the extent the management might choose to exercise control over its employees or to delegate functions
or to the extent to which persons pedorming services
for them may for ·some purposes be either "employees"
or "independent contractors".
Further, liability for contributions, in the computation of wage credits on which benefits are based under the
unemployment compensation act, cannot, and should not,
shift from moment to moment with each variation in the
degree of control exercisable by the principal over the activities of the individual performing services, nor can it
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or should it vary with the ownership of the particular
tool or instrumentality used in connection with the employment whieh may cause an injury to an employee or
third person. Liability, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, however, may so vary. To interpolate, therefore, this doctrine into unemployment eompensation
would ereate an impossible administrative task. It would
be utterly eonfusing if under the statute it should be
necessary to weigh the relationship in terms of possible
tort liability at each moment and to determine, for the
purpose of benefits or contributions, the amount of remuneration paid to an employee for the specific activities
of the employee for which the employer might have
incurred a tort liability. It is the general relationship,
the general status of the individual and his economic
relationship to an enterprise, which is significant under
the stattt,te. These distinctions between the operation
of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the principles
applieable to the unemployment compensation law are
well summarized in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company
v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (Circuit Court,
Dane County, \Visconsin, March 13, 1939, CCH Unemployment Insurance Service, \Vis. para. 8122) *, in which
the eourt, in construing a statutory definition of employment similar to that contained in section 19 (j) of the
Utah unemployment compensation law, said:
"Unemployment compensation (to use the commission's rather scholarly diction) is predicated
*A copy of this opinion is atta;ched hereto marked "Exhibit C", p.
122 infra.
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upon the 'flovv of time' element in employment
whereas tort liability or liability in the field of
workmen's compensation focuses upon the 'instant of time' element."
Thus, it is submitted, that this statute in Section 19
(j) ( 5) clearly evidences a realistic approach towards
solving questions of coverag·e for the purposes of unemployment compensation. Under the statute, it is the status
of the individual that is all important; not his relationship at a particular moment of time. The importance of
this shift in emphasis for the purposes of unemployment
compensation as well as the necessity therefor was fully
recognized by Mr. J·ohn C. Gall, .counsel for the National
Association of Manufacturers, when he wrote (3 Law and
Contemporary Problems (1936) p. 122):
''A paywll tax * * * is a tax imposed upon
an economic relationshi;p which has escaped legal
definition. At c.ornmon law the relationship of
master and servant was marked out under the
law of contrad aiHl tort. vVell established delineati·ons carried us into the law of principal and
agent, or succeeded in creating a new relationship
of independent contractor. Under modern statute
law the emphasis has shifted frotn contra;ct to
status, and delineation of the employer-employee
relationship has been controlled by the impact of
public policy represented in modern lcqislation.
For example, the relationship, under workmen's
C·ompensation laws and employer's liability acts
is defined to relate the employer's liability to the
degree of control exercised over the employee or
his place of employment. Under more recent legislation pertaining to lahor disputes, the relationship of employer and employee is differently de-
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fined (citing 29 U. S. C. A. (Sup. 1935) sec. 152
(5)) to effectuate an entirely different public policy. It is obviou.s that under unemployment compensa-tion la.ws the relations.hips must be even further defined to reflect the new social responsibilities imposed upon employers." (Italic sup~)lied).

To hold, therefore, that Section 19 (j) (5) is merely
declaratory of the traditional common law master-servant relationship would not only ignore the legislative intent thereof as evidenced by the history of the section
and the plan and purpose of the statute, but also to deny
to the legislature the power to fix rights and liabilities
under the act in the manner it deemed best suited to meet
the problems .of involuntary unemployment. It would
also mean a complete denial on the part of the court of
power in the legislature to emphasize for the purposes
of this s·tatute the status of individuals; to regard relationships in terms of the dependence of individuals for
remuneration on the will of another, or the continuation
of Hw business of another; and to prevent the legislature, by a redefinition of concepts, fr.om accomplishing
that which many legislatures have already done even for
workmen's compensation purposes, i.e., to enlarge the
s·cope of coverage so as to include thereunder persons
who, under traditional common law master-servant tests,
might otherwise be regarded as independent contractors.
See Cales v. Williamson (Mo. 1938), 117 S. W. (2d) 655;
McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839;
O'Hoyle v. Parker-Yottng Co., 95 Vt. 58, 112 Atl. 385; see
also "Digest of

~Workmen's

Compensation Laws" (1937
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ed.) issued by Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, p. XIII.

It is highly significant that in all but one instance
the courts of the several states when called upon to determine the scope .of coverage under an unemployment
compensation law which embodied a definition of "employment" and definitions of "employing unit",
"wages", and "employer", like those in the Utah unemployment compensati.ou law have held that their respective legislatures, in the definition sections of the laws,
showed ''a carefully considered and deliberate purpose
to leap many legal barriers which ·would halt less ambitions enactments as far as language will permit it" and
"to sweep beyond and to include, by redefiniti.on, many
individuals who would have been otherwise excluded from
the benefits of t:he act by the former concepts of master
and servant and principal and agent as recognized at
common law.'' North Carolina Uuemploytnent Compensation Commission v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance
Co., 215 N. Car. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584; Industrial Commission of Colorado v. N orthwestcrn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560; Wisconsin
Bridge and Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wis-

consin and Ramsey, Exhibit C, p. 122, infra; Pond v.
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission and
Heinz Lumber Co., Circuit Court, Michigan, Marquette
County, September 18, 1939. *
*A copy of this opinion is attached to this brief, Exhibit D, p. 137
infra.
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The single de<Cisi·on which has not so held is that of
Washington Recorder Co. v. Ernst, (Wash. 1939) 91 P.
(2d) 718. This decision was rendered by Department II
of the Washington Supreme Court and is, moreover, at
variance wit:h a decision rendered by Department I of
the Washington Supreme Court in M cDerrnott v. State of
Washington CWash. 1938), 82 P. (2d) 568. No hearing
has ever been had ou either of these cases before the
\Yashington Supreme Court en bane as in the \Y ashington Recorder case, the Department which decided the suit
refused to allow a petition for argument and hearing before the full court. Moreover, not only is the vY ashington
Reeorder decision in conflict with all other cases which
have eonstmed a definiti.on of "employment" similar to
that coutained in Section 19 (j) (5) of the Utah law, but
it is also inconsisteut ~within itself. In construing section 19 (g) (5) of the Washington unemployment compeusation act it purports t.o hold that the "A" and "C"
provisions thereof are merely restatements of the common law tests of the existence of the master and servant
relationship, but that the "B" provision is wholly unlike
the c·ommon law and represents a statutory criterion.
Thus within a single section of the law defining employment there is contained, aceording to its view, both a
common law definition and a statutory definition. It is
submitted that in reading this opinion the oonclusion is
inescapable that it is but an isolated instance of w:hat
Mr. Justice Holmes once described as "One of the misfortunes of the law" in that "ideas become encysted in
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke
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further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 22,5 U. S. 347,
391.
B. The relationship between Thomas and Globe
Grain and Milling Company constituted employment as defined in Section 19 (j) ( 5) of the law.
The three statutory criteria in section 19 (j) (5) are
m the oonjunctive. A showing of conformity with all
three is a prerequisite to an exemption of coverage under
t'he law. The finding of this court that Thomas was in
employment was based upon a consideration of subsection C of section 19 (j) (5) and it is this finding which
Globe Grain and Milling Company assails in its petition
for rehearing. The provision reads:
"Such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.''
The C·Olllpany urges that the court should consider
"customarily" in this subsection as "existing". If by
this the company seeks to substitute a theoretical standard based on the existence of businesses or occupations in
which entrepreneurs perform activities similar to that
of an employee who is not the operator of an established
business, it is urging a standard that has no relationshipship to the problem of unemployment. The statute speaks
in terms of the individual and therefore the test is not
whether others might "customarily" be engaged in independently established businesses but whether the individual involved is so engaged. Thus the statute speaks
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of the business as being "independently established";
not merely of being independent. The nature of the establishment governs whether the individual is subject to
the type of risk which should be covered by unemployment ,compensation-whether the individual is so established that notwithstanding tho fact that a particular
connection is severed, he is in a position to continuo to
operate on his O>Yn account. This criterion is not met
unless tho individual is so sot up that he is not dependent
upon the continuance of a connection with a single company for a livelihood. In addition, he must be in a position to perform the duties incident to his business in
accordance with his own methods; he must be free to buy
his merchandise in tho competitive market; the good will
of the business must be his own transferrable at his
pleasure and for a considorati.on satisfactory to him; he
must be able to select his tools and fixtures; determine
his sales policy and his met hod ·Of advertising; and he
must he free to perform the same or similar services for
others while he is serving a particular eompany. This
is the essence of being "independently established" and
"customarily" in a business, trade, or occupation and
it was so defined by the Colorado Supreme Court in

Industrial Commission of Colorado v·. Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550; 88 P. (2d) 560.
In that case, the court said:
''The third test as to exemption from coverage
is that the 'individual' is customarily engaged
independently in an established trade, oocupation, profession or business. This would neces-
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sitate a showing by the company to the satisfaction of the Commission that its agents are established in the business of selling insu:ra!f~ce, independent of whatever connection they may have
with the company." (Italics supplied).
See also Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Wisconsin Industrial
Commission, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra; Pond v. Michigan
Unemployment Compensation Commission, Exhibit D, p.
137 infra.
Under the construction which the 0ompany urges,
the provision requiring a showing that the individual in
question must be s'hown to be customarily and independently established in a trade or business would be meaningless. There is practically no activity in which an employee may be engaged that may not be the substance of
an 11independently established business. Every bricklayer, salesman, painter, cook, truck driver, etc., is engaged in activities which are parallelled by existing and
independently established businesses. There are established brokerage houses which sell and handle feed for
livestock and processed agricultural products. Such a
broker may solicit customers or take ·orders from manufacturers, nevert1heless their businesses, unlike that of
Thomas, is not subject to summary termination through
the ads of a person with whom they 0ontract and the
good will they develop is their good will.
But by no stretch of the imagination could Thomas
have been c·onsidered to be a broker. He could not and
did not hold himself out as being ready and able to handle
the distribution of livestock feeds generally for any
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manufacturer or distributor who might seek his services.
The contract required him to dev·ote himself exclusively
to the development and distribution of the company's
products in a particular territory. Upon the termination of his connection with Gl.obe Grain and Milling Company, Thomas could not undertake to continue the distribution of feed for livestock. Before he c.ould engage
in such activity he ·would have to secure a new job. He
ihad no right to the customers and the company owned
the good will he had developed. In brief, his business
was in no sense independently established; it was entirely
dependent upon the continuance of a contractual association with the company and, in all material respects,
·was restricted to the company and subordinated to its
interests. See Comer v. State Tax Commission, (N.Mex.
1937), 69 P. (2d) 936.
Kor can it be successfully .contended that Thomas
,,·as independently established as an insurance broker.
There is no evidence in the record to show that he had a
broker's license nor that he had any resource other than
to seek a job selling insurance. In this respect the situation herein involved is substantially like those involved
in Pond v. MichipMt Unemployment Commission, Exhibit
D, p. 137 infra, and in Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Company v. Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation and
Ramsey, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra, in which it was held
that the mere fact that a trade might be the subject of
an independently established trade or business did not
exclude an individual from the scope of coverage under
the act unless the individual was independently estab-
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lished and customarily in the trade, business, or occupation ·Or was independently established and customarily
in some other trade, business or occupation.
Moreover, under the facts of this case the Industrial
Commission re,asonahly held that the relationship between Thomas and Globe Grain and Milling Company
failed to meet the criterion for exclusion in Section 19
(j) (5) (a) of the law. 'l1 his condition requires a showing
that"Such individual has been and will continue to be
free from contr.ol or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of
service and in fact." (Italics supplied).
To conform with this condition, the party claiming exemption from the act must show not only that under the
contract of employment tho principal has not exorcised
and does not have the right to exercise control over the
performance .of service, but that the person performing
the service is free from control or the possibility of control in tho future both under the contract and in fact.
The statutory test .above cited is considerably different fr.om the test employed at common law to dotermine tho existence of tho master-servant relationship
in that there is absent therefrom tho factor of control
over tho details of the services performed which is commonly referred to in the Restatement definition relied
upon by the company and amici curiae. Subsection (~a)
of the statutory test contains a positive requirement that
the individual performing services be free from control

7'5

over his performance if exemption is to be granted. The
approach in section 19 (j) (5) (a) to the question of freedom from control differs from t:he appwach at common
law, because the common law statement of the contr.ol
test, as is indicated by the cases cited in the company in
its original brief, requires that control extend to the details of performance. This requirement, however, does
not appear in the statute. Under the statute, it is unnecessary to determine what is a detail and what is ''satisfaction 'vith a result." The statutory relationship exists
if the employer has a general control over the service
performed. Such general control for the purposes of the
statu.tory starndard is present when the manner and
means .of performance are either predetermined by contract, necessarily resulting from the circumstances under
which the services are performed, or flow from the economic relationship which the persons performing t:he
services bear to the enterprise for which they are performed. In recogniti.on of this difference between the
statutory test provided in section 19 (j) (5) (a) and the
common law test relating to control, the Supreme Court
of Colorado in Industrial Commission of the State of
Colorado

t".

Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.,

103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 5GO, stated, with respect to a
statutory definition of employment identical

~with

that

contained in the Utah statute:
"The first condition in the statutory test relates
to freedom of control and direction over the performance of services, both under coutraet and in
fact. rrhe test of freedom is either under contract

or faot. Does the company control and direct the
performance of services, or will it have the right
t·o do so under the con tract, if it desires to do so?
We are not here concerned with details but with
general control. The possibility of control in the
future is as important as no actual control at the
present.
"In discussing the evidence we shall be controlled
primarily by the undisputed facts, such as the
contracts and the 'Rules and Instrudions' governing the persons involved herein in their relations with the company. The question of control
and direction, as set forth in section 19 (g) (5), is
not a matter of degree. Undoubtedly, it relates
to general control. It is not satisfied by some 'detail' in which the individual may be free to exercise his own judgment. The power to terminate
a contmct for personal service at any time without liability is an important factor in arriving
at a conclusion as to whether the individual is
free of c-ontrol and direction, 'because the right
immediately to discharge involves the right of
eontrol.' Industrial Com. v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. :306,
308, 241 Pac. 735." (Italics supplied).
The view excpressed by the Colorado court with respeet to the significant differences between the common
law test of control and the statutory test ~was adopted by
a Wisconsin court. See Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v.
lndw;trial Commission, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra. In the
course of interpreting statutory language identical with
section 19 ( j) ( 5) (a) the Wis0onsin court said :
"For purposes of the present decision, we need
not go into all the points wherein the present ler~
islative definition of employment departs from
prior accepted standards. For instance, it has
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been regarded-and must still be so viewed under
the workmen's compensation law-that lack of
right to control is what precludes, in essence, the
empl.oyment status. But by the first test of exclusion prescribed in 108.02 ( 5) (a), it must be established that there is freedom from control not only
(1) under the contract but also (2) in fact. Furthermore there must be established not only freedom from coentrol in the past but that the individual 'will continue to be free from the employer's
control or direction. * * *' '' (Italics supplied).

If, therefore, the power of contr.ol exists under the contract or in fact, proof of the extent of its actual exercise
or even proof of its non-exercise is wholly immateriaL
The startute looks to control which may be exercised in
the future and it is sufficient under the statute to constitute employment if the employer has the power, if he
chooses to exercise it, over the performance of service
at any time during the continuance of the relationship.
Applying the foregoing analysis of section 19 (j)
(5) (a) to the facts in this case, it would seem to be clear
that Thomas was not either under his contract or in
fact, free from control or from the possibility of such
control in the future. The company at any time could
have conditioned the .continuance of the relationship between it and Thomas upon his submission to any instructions or restrictions which it might have chosen to impose. The company could have conditioned its acceptance of any order and the payment of C•ommissions to
Thomas on his compliance with its instructions as to any
phase of his activities. The company could have condi-
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tioned the -continuance of the relationship on compliance
with its instructions as to when, where, and whom Thomas should solicit. His remuneration could have been made
conditional on his covering a designated territory at a
particular time, on answering correspondence in a certain
way, or on his refraining from disclosing informati.on
as to the ·company's operations. T:he company not only
could have vetoed any assistants fm Thomas but it
could have refused to permit him to utilize assistants.
See Ludlow v. lndustr·ial Co•mmission, 65 Utah 182, 235
P. 884, 888.
By the terms of the arrangement, it was clearly contempl·ated that Thomas would personally promote the
sale of the company's •products. The company could
have at any time fired Thomas, or ,conditioned continuance .of his services for it on submission to its will. \Vhatever freedom T:homas had in the performance of his
services was at the sufferance of the company. Under
such circumstances it is only reasonable to conclude that
Thomas was not and would not continue to be free from
the employer's right or power to exercise control either
under the contract or in fact.
Further, under these circumstances it would not even
be unreas.onable to hold that the relationship between
the company and Thomas was tihat of master-servant
at common law.

The company and the amici in discuss-

ing the common law relationship of master and servant
have overlooked a primary conditi·on for the existence
of the status of an "independent contractor"; namely,
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that a person performing services is not an "independent contractor" unless the contract f.or the services provides a fixed and definite result upon the completion of
which such person is entitled to the contract price. See
Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, supra. N.o sucJh predetermined result existed in this case. The power of the
company to determine from time to time, the price,
quantity, and the product to be sold by Thomas and to
en£orce its will on all matters affecting the manner and
means of his performance of the services by conditioning
the continuance of the relationship on the acceptance by
Thomas of the company's will, negatives the existence
of a ''result''. The .company did not undertake to make
available any fixed quantity of goods to be sold by
Thomas, nor did it undertake not to discontinue the line
he was handling.
Jn addition, Thomas' compensation was subject to
change by the company at any time. The company through
the simple device of giving notice of termination of the
contract could change or threaten to change Thomas'
commission rates, or require him to service his
or other accounts of the company as a condition
to recmvmg remuneration.
Thus, the company's
power growing out of such right .of termination to
condition performance and compensation upon submission to such conditions as it might from time to time
have imposed negatives the existence of a "result" and
demonstrates the company's rights or powers of contract. The absence of a predetermined result upon the
completion of which Thomas would be entitled to the con-
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tract price not only brings the relationship within the
statutory definition of employment but under the authorities would establish a common law master-servant relationship.
In Indu,<;trial Commission of Colorado v. Bonfils, 78
Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735, a workmen's compensation case,
one C. Sprigg, was engaged to haul coal with his own
truck at a fixed price per ton by the Continental Investment Company, and was accidentally killed while so engaged. The question before the court was whether or
not the deceased was an employee under section 9 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act which reads as follows:
*

*

*

Every person in the service of any other person

*

*

*

*

*

"The term 'employee' shall mean and include:

*"

under any oontract of hire, express or implied.
The cotwt said (at p. 736) :

''A servant is one whose employer has t<he order
and control of work done by him, and who directs
or may direct the means as well as the end. Arnold
v. Lawrence, 72 Colo. 528, 530, 213 P. 12D. By
virtue of its pmuer to discharge, the company
could, at any moment, direct the minutest detail
and method of the work. The fact, if a fact, that
it did not do so is immaterial. It is the power of
control, not the fact of control, that is the principal factor in distinguishing a servant from a contractor. Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Ind. Com.,
296 Ill. 329, 129 N. E. 811. The most important
point 'in determining the main question [c.ontractor or employee] is the right of either to terminate the relation without liability.' Ind. Com. v.
Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006. This is
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a ·confirmation by this court of the rule above
stated as to control, because the right immediatel.v to discharge involves the right of control."
(Italics supplied).
In L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Industrial Commission, et al., 4:3 Ariz. 257, 30 P. (2d) 491, the court, in determining that a commission salesman was performing
services as -an employee under common law concepts,
said (at p. 494):
''And in determining if the employer retains control the most important factor is whether either
party may terminate the relation without liability.
'-Where such right exists,' to use the language of
the C'Ourt in Industrial Commission v. Hammond,
77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006, 1008, 'the workman is
usually a servant. \Vhere it does not exist, he is
usually a contrac~tor.' The power of the employer
to end the employment at any time he sees fit is
incompatible with the full control of the work
which au independent contractor enj-oys. 14 R.
C. L. 72; Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Commission, 190 Cal. 114, 210 P. 820; New York
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission of
California, 80 Cal. App. 713, 252 P. 775; Clark's
Case, 124 Me. 47, 126 A. 18."
In Aiscnberg v. C. F. Adams Company, Inc., et al.,
95 Conn. 419, 111 Atl. 591, a travelling salesman whose
c-ompensation depended on commission sales, was held
to be an employee within the workmen's compensation
act, which provided: "Employee shall mean any person
who has entered into or works under any contract of
service -or apprenticeship with an employer." In reject-
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ing the company's claim that the deceased

~was

not work-

ing under a contract of service because he was free to
sell to anyone, the Connecticut cour1t emphasized that the
employer's control over the kind and quantity .of product
to be sold negatived the existence of a result which is essential to the existence of the independent contractor
relationship. The court said (p. 592) :
"The means and method of conditioning this business, as we have in part detailed, comprise the
essence of this business. The subject of sale, the
terms of sale, and the proceeds of sale remained
in the control of the compa.ny. Practically this
constituted a general control.
"But the liberty to go anywhere in the entire state
enlarged the freedom of action of this salesman
over that of the ordinary salesman, but it llid not
enlarge his .control over the go.ods sold, the tenus
of sale, or the proceeds of the sale. The fad
that the deceased could regulate his ovYn hours
of work is without signifieance. His pay depended upon the results of his sales. The particular
hours he v\'orked were unimportant to his employer, provided adequate sales were made. \Yheu
this did not result, the company was at liherty
at any time to discharge the deceasecl from their
employment. The right of discharge is one of
the str.ong indications that the relation was one of
ernploymen t. An independent contractor rm1st be
permitted to finish his contract in the absence of
breach on his part. That the deceased was paid by
commission is not a. drtermining test, but, as a
rule, it is quitr immaterial how the payment is
made, tuhcther in wa. ges, salary, or commission, or'
by t1he piece o1· job." (Italics SUipplied).
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For similar holdings with respect to comnusswn
salesman see W,ilson v. Times Printing Company, et al.,
158 ~Wash. 95, 290 Pac. 691; Borah v. Zoellner Motor Car
Compa1ny (Mo. App. 1924), 257 S. W. 145; Burgess v.
Garvin, et al., 219 Mo. App. 162, 272 S. \V. 108; Mitchem
v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Company, 45 Ga. App. 809,
165 S. E. 889; Dishman v. Whitney, et al., 121 Wash. 157,
209 Pac. 12; Leuis v. National Cash Register Company,
84 N.J. Law 598, 87 Atl. 345; Singer Manufacturing Company v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518; Brown, v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, et al., 174 Cal. 457, 163
Pa·c. 664; Dillon v. Prudential Insurance Catnpany of
America, et al., 75 Cal. App. 266, 242 Pac. 73G; Howell
v. Continental Casualty Co. (Texas 1937), 110 S. W. (2d)
210; Auer v. Sinclair Refining Company, et al., 103 N. J.
Law 372, 137 Atl. 555; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of Baltimore, Maryland v. Lowry (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921), 231 S. ~W. 818; Bronx Home News v.
Miller (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55.
C. The statutory definition does not impair the obligwtions ·Of con tracts.
Globe Grain and Milling Company urge t:hat the unemployment com pen sa tion law "abrogates the contract
between it and Thomas, creates an entirely new relationship and, therefore, the application of the statute is unconstitutional.'' This assumes that the statute abolishes,
or prohibits, the exercise of any rights of the parties
under their contract.
tenable.

This assumption is, however, un-

T:he law does not affect any element of the
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preexisting contra-ctual obligations between the company
and Thomas, nor does it interfere with their right to
make any contract they may choose. The a0t imposes
an exaction upon the exercise of the right t·O· employ as
defined in the statute, hut does not impinge on the right
to contract or on the performance of the contract. The
definition of employment does not change the status of
the parties nor prevent them from entering into or performing any contract they may see fit to make. The law
takes the parties in the situation they have created. That
the imposition of an exaction on the exercise .of a right
to -contract or arising out of a contract does not impair
the obligation of contracts is a principle of lmv that is
beyond question. ~ he parties do not have the right to
enter into an agreement that they shall not be subject to
an exadion. BaruFise v. Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514; Kehrer 1).
Stewart, 197, U. S. 60. The Kehrer ease is closely analogous t.o this case. In that case a state exaction was
levied upon ''all agents of packing houses doing business in'' the State of Georgia. It vvas claimed that the
exaction impaired the obligations of a preexisting contract between a packing :house and a local salesman. The
court, however, in holding that the statute did not impair
the obligations arising under the contract, said:
1

"The argument that the tax impairs the obligation of a contract between the petitioner and N elson M.orris & Company is hardly worthy of serious ·Consideration. The power of taxation overrides any agreement of .an employe to serve for
a specific sum. H;s contract remains entirely
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undisturbed. There was no stipulation for an
employment for a definite period; and if there
were, it is inconceivable that the State should
lose this right of taxation by the fac:t that the
party taxed had entered into an engagement with
his employer for a definite period." (p. 70)
The argument of the plaintiff that the unempl.oyment compensation law impairs the obligation of its contract with ~'homas is further disposed of by the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Providence Bank
v. Billings, 4 Pet. ( U. S.) 514. In that case it was held
that in the absence .of a specific grant of exemption from
exactions by the State subsequent to the date of the grant
of a corporate franchise, a State could require the payment of exactions on 1the exercise of rights created under
such a franchise.
But even if it be assumed that the statute does interfere with the performance of the c.ontracts or the
rights of the party, it would not eontravenc the constitutional prohibition agaiust impairment of contracts. In

Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 47:3, the United States
Supreme Court said (p. 480):
"It is the settled law of this eourt that the interdiction of the statutes impairing the obligation
of ·contracts docs not prevent the State from exercising such powers as arc vested in it for the
promoti.on of the common weal, or arc necessary
for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals
may thereby be affected. This power, which in its
various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
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Government to protect the lives, health, morals,
comfort and general welfare of Hw people, and is
paramount to any rights under contracts between
individuals. Familiar instances of this are, where
parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at
·the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment by a change of policy .on the
part of tho State, prohibiting tho establishment
or continuance of such traffic ;-in other words,
that parties by entering into contracts may not
estop the legislature fr.om enacting laws intended
for H1e public good.
"~While this povver is subject to limitations on certain cases, there is wide discretion on tho part of
the legislature in determining what is and what is
not necessary-a discreti.on which courts ordinarily will not interfere with."

See also Bacon v. W allcer, 204 U. S. 311; N orthrwestern
Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486; Village of Euclirl
v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, 392; Rosenthal v. N erw York~
226 U. S. 260; Lilmiewx v. Young, 211 U. S. 489; Kidd,
Dater & Price Co. v. Musselnwm Grocery Co., 271 U. S.
461; Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284
U. S. 151; Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 520; Sli,(}h
v. Kirbough, 237 U. S. 52, 58.
D. Tho argument of amici curiae that if coverage
extends beyond the common law master-servant
relationship, the statute is a guaranteed income
law is disproved by the provisions of the statute.
Amici curiae assert that to extend the s.c.ope of coverage of the unemployment compensation law beyond the
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common-law master-servant relationship would render
the law a "guaranteed income" statute. This attack
upon the law is merely an argument addressed as to the
wisdom .of unemployment compensation laws and is a
matter which the legislature already has decided. Moreover, amici seemed to believe t:hat the receipt of benefits follows automatically from the termination of employment. They overlook the legislative requirements
that an individual, to receive benefits, must meet the conditions for eligibility set forth in section 4 of the lav\'.
Such conditions require that the individual shall have
earned "'wages' in employment," that he must be unemployed, be ready to work as well as willing and able to
work. Whether o1· not a person when employed was subject to that degree of control which would have made his
employer liable for his torts, such pe1·son when unemployed presents the same social and economic problem
as the individual who unquestionably was subject to such
control. Both have lost their jobs, and both are seeking
an employer. Thomas, when he was no longer in the employ of the company, had to seek a new job. Only on the
basis of his being willing to work but unable to find
work, is he entitled to benefits.
Amici also argue that contributions are an exc1se
and, theref.ore, a rule of strict construction should be
applied in fixing the scope of coverage of the law. But all
rules of construction yield to a stated legislative intent,
and in ,section 2 of the act the legislature has declared
its policy to be the establishment of a statutory plan to
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alleviate distress caused by involuntary unemployment
under the "police power". The statute seeks to solve
and ameliorate the problems of unemployment and thus
pmmote the public health, morals, and welfare. The
problem of coverage under the act relates not only to an
exaction from employers but to individual benefit rights.
The legislative reference to the police power indicates
that the plan as a whole should be liberally construed.
But even if it be assumed for the 1purpose of argument
that contributions are taxes, the rule contended for by
amici would not apply. The statutory definition of employment, by stating in clear terms the scope of c,overage
under the act, bars application of the principle that excise taxes are to be narrowly construed. The problem
here presented is not that of adopting a strict or liberal
constructi,on of the statute, but of applying the statutory
definition of employment rather than the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Alexander v. Casden, 290 U. S. 484,
496, the Supreme Court said:
''Although imposing a tax, tlley are to be construed reasonably and the in tent and purpose of
each is to be ascertained by examining all of its
provisions.''
To allow full operation t,o. the definition of employment,
would not contravene rules of construction, but would
conform to such rules.

Meaning must be given to each

provision of a law. In II elvering, Comr. of Internal Rev-

enue v. Stockholms Enskilda Bamk, 293 U. S. 84, the Supreme Court said (p. 93):

89
''In the foregoing discussion, we have not been
unmindful of the rule, frequently stated by this
court, that taxing acts 'are not to be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of the language used,' and that doubts are to be resolved
against tihe government and in favor of the taxpayer. The rule is a salutary one, but it does not
apply here. The intention of the la vvmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does
in the oonstruction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word
or clause in question from its setting and viewing
it apart, hut by considering it in connection ·with
the -context, the general purposes of the statute
in which it is found, the .occasion and circumstances of its use, and other a!ppropriate tests for
the ascertainment of the legislative will. Compare
Rein v. T_1ane, L. R 2 Q. B. Cases 144, 151. The
intention being thus disclosed, it is enough that
the word or clause is reasonably susceptible of
a meauinq consonant there with, whatever 1night
be its meaning ·in another and different connection. vVe are not at liberty to reject the meaning
so established and adopt another lying outside
the intention of the legislature, simply because
the latter would release the taxpayer or bear
:heavily against him. To do so would be not to
resolve a doubt in his favor, but to say that the
statute does not mean what it means.

'' 'The rule of stt·ict construction is not violated
by permitting the words of a statute to have their
full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings. The 1cords are not to be bent one way or
the other, but to be taken in the sense which w·ill
best manifest the lc,gislative intent. United States
v. Hartwell, 6 \Vall. 385, 396; United Stales v.
Corbett, 215 U . .S. 233, 242.' Sacramento Nav. Co.
v. Salz, 273 U. S. 326, 329. The rule of strict
construction applies to penal laws, but such laws
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arc not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious intention of the lc~islaturc; .or so applied
as to narrow the >vords of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in the sense
that the legislature has obvi.ously used them, \V(mld
comprehend. United States v. W iltbre/}er, 5
\Vheat. 76, 9·5. That view, expressed by Chief
.Justice Marshall, has since been frequently followed by this court. See, for example, American
Fur Co. v. Ur1,ited States, 2 Pet. i358, 367; United
States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475; United States v.
Ilartwell, supra, 395-6; Donnelley v. United States,
276 U.S. 505, 512." (Italics supplied). Sec also
Board of Education of Carbon County School District v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627, G2H.

v.
CONTHARY TO THE CONTENTIONS OF AMICI, ADMINISTRATIVE OPINIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE NOT
RESTRICTED THE SCOPE OF THE A-B-C PROVISIONS TO
THI<; COMMON LAW MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP:
THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE STATUTE IS NOT
IDENTICAL WITH COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDEHAL LAW,
OR UNDER STATUTES DEFINING EMPLOYMENT IN TimMS
01<' THE MASTER-SERVANT REILATIONSHlP: A DISREGARD
OI<' THE STATUTORY DEFINITION \\'ILL NOT INSURE UNIl<'OHMITY OF COVERAGE.

The company and amici curiae insist that (a) coverage under the State law should be restricted to that of
the Federal law as intenpreted by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; (b) this court should reverse the :holding in this
case and foUow the opinions rendered iu the cases of
Washington Recorder Publishing Company v. Ernst, su-
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pra, and Texas Oil Company v. Wheeless (Miss. 1939),
187 t;o. 880 ( deride(l on demurrer and remanded for trial
under a statute which eontaim; a definition of "employment" unlike the one set forth in section 19(j) (G) of the
Utah law) ; and (c) this court should disregard the opinions in the eases of Industrial Commission of the State
of Colorado v. Northwestern 11futual Life lnswrancc Co.,
supra; Unemployrnent Compensation Commission of
North Carolina v. J eff'erson Stmulard Insurance Company, supra; aml McDermott v. Stale of JVashington,
supra. rrhis procedure, it is urged, will bring about uniformity in the interpretation of unemployment eompcm;ation laws.
Tlw \Yhole strudure of this argument falls when it
is realized that (1) the Bureau of Internal Revenue, eontrary to the decision in the Mississippi case, has ruled
that the 1pers.cms involved in that ease, i.e., persons engaged in the operation of bulk distribution plants of the
Texas Company, \Vere in employment under titles 1400
and lGOO of the lntemal Revenue Code (formerly titles
VIII and IX of the Social Seeurity Aet)*; (2) in the
case of Bnmx 11 ome ]•lews v. Miller, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55,
the court, in interpreting the New York unemployment
(•ompensation law, held a 11ewspaper route carrier to be
in "employment" under practically the same fads as
those presented in the case of ~Washington Recorder Publislti11/J Company v. Er11sf; and (3) the lVashinqton Rec*A copy of this ruling as it appears attached to bill of complaint
of the Texas Company in Texas Company v. Higgins in the United
States Distriet Court, Southern District of New York is appended
hereto, l£xhibii E, p. 143 infra.
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order ease ·was decided by one of the departments of the
Washington Supreme Court, and in view of the decision
of the other department of that court in McDermott v.
State of Washington, the ultimate position of the Washington Supreme Court, with respect to the scope of coverage of the ·washington unemployment compensation
law, i:,; :,;peculative. A:,; was indicated above, the court
·which wr,oto the Washington Recorder opinion was not
the court which had written the McDermott decision, and
the Washington Supreme Court has not, as is claimed
by amici," specifically and explicitly repudiated any such
construction as the Colorado court had attempted to
place upon the McDermott case''. Furthermore, amici's
attempt to distinguish the ease of Jefferson Standard
Life Insuirance Company on the assertion that the court
in t;Jtat case did not consider the rulings of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, is absolutely groundless. The dissenting ,opinion in that ease referred to rulings of the
Bureau of Internal Hevenue, and in Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Wachovia
Hank & Trust Co., 2 S. E. (2d) 592, decided on the same
day as the Jefferson Standard case, the North Cawlina
Supreme Court, in inte11preting the term "instrumentalities" in the State act which, unlike the definition of employment, parallelled the term "instrumentalities" in
the Federal act, said:
"We cannot eoncei ve that the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, exempting the defendant from the payment of tax under the S.ocial
Security Act, is based on sound reason or logic.
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While we fully appreciate the high purposes of
the national plan and concur in the desire of this
State to cooperate therein, we are unable in this
instance to follow or to adopt the ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his interpretation of language in the Social Security Act
w'hich is similar to that contained in our act. Nor
is the fact that the North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission for a time likewise interpreted the language in the North Carolina act, while persuasive, conclusive upon us."
A similar approa,ch to the problem of whether states
should follow Bureau of Internal Revenue rulings was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Capitol
Bttilding & Loan Association v. Kansas Commissioner
of Labor and Industry, (Kansas 1938) 83 P. (2d) 106,
where the court refused to follow a ruling of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue wit;h respect to its interpretation of
the term "instrumentalities". Also, we have carefully
read the majority opini,on in the Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance Company case and cannot find the language
"clearly involving independent contractors" which amici,
on page 31 of its brief, purport to quote from that opin1on.

It would, therefore, seem that the uniformity sought
by amici curiae would not be achieved by attempting to
apply the indefinite distinctions governing the employment relationship at common law nor by f,ollowing the
rulings of a Federal administrative agency under analogous or nonanalogous statutory provisions.
is precisely the position of amici.

Yet this
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The other statements made by amici in attempting
to sustain the argument that this court can and should
follow administrative determinations by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue are like~wise groundless. The assertion
that the decision in Industrial Cmnmission of the State of
Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins·urance Cornpany, 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560, "is now obsolete"
overlooks entirely that the Colorado legislature has
amended its definiti,on of employment only with rospeet
to insurance agents. T·he general statutory dofmition
of employment under the Colorado law has not been
changed. This indicates an affirmance of the prior administrative and judicial interpretation of the definition.
Soc 25 Ruling Case Law, p. 983, see. 230 in which the
pertinent rule in this c.onnection is stated in tho followmg:
"The exeeption of a partieular thing from ilw
operation of the general words of a statute shows
that, in tho opinion of tho lawmaker, tho thinf!;
exeeptod ~would he within the general ·worcls, had
11ot tho exc-eption been mmle. ''
The amendment excluding only one group out of the
many relationships within tho scope of the statutory definitioll, as applied in the N orthn·estern Mutual J>ife Insurance Compatly case, thus dearly imllratos that the
general scope of t:l10 dofini ti.on was not intended to be
affected by the amendment. The Colorado legislature
did not ill sort an cxomptio11 into its law of "independent
contraetors" uor did it repeal tho statu tory dofini tion of
employment. 1'-,urthermore, the Supreme Court of \Vis-
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consin has not taken a position inconsistent ~with the .one
taken by this court in its opinion in this case. Slocum
Straw Works v. lnd11strial Commission (\Vis. 1939), 286
N. \Y. 39:~, cited on page 25 of the brief of amici, did not
involve the scope of c.overago of the \Visconsin unemployment compensation law nor of the scope of the statutory definition of employment in that law. T'ho question there involved was whether or not a married woman
~who had been employed and returned to her household
duties, was self-employed and hence not entitled to benefits. The eourt held that under the circumstances of the
case, she ~was performing services for the household, the
head ,o.f which was a parent, not her husband, aiHl therefore she was not unemployed as required by the law.
The -Wisconsin court did not have before it the scope of
the employment relationship under its law, and there is
absolutely no indication nor any reason to suppose that
t'he court in that case intended to pass on the criteria
for determining the existence of the employment relationship. Further, in Wisconsin Bridge ((J; Iron Cornpany
v. 11ulustrial Commission of Wisconsin, Exhibit C, p. 122
infra, the ~Wisconsin Circuit Court recently held that
tht~ three criteria tests for employment ~were more inclusive than any common law test, and that tho ronrept
of independent contractor was not pertinent to a determination of coverage under the \Visconsin unemployment compensation law.
Nor do amici's assertions with respect to the admiuistrati\'e rulings of other jurisdidions withstand
analysis. It is true that most employers coming within
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the terms of the Federal Act are likely to be included
within the coverage of State unemployment compensation laws unless they are not specifically exempt. The
coverage of State laws is generally at least as broad as
that of the Federal Act. But this does not establish that
administrative exemptions from coverage under the Federal Act are to be applied automatically to all State laws
nor that the coverage of State laws is restricted to that
of the Federal Acts. The administrative rulings from
other jurisdictions upon ·which amici rely were not introduced in evidence nor made a part of the record. Indeed, from aught that appears, these rulings dealt with
fact situations, wholly dissimilar from the .one involved
in this case and with statutes containing different definitions of employment than t:hat incorporated into the
Utah law. If the rulings refer to insurance brokers, they
may be correct; but if they refer to commission salesmen, they, or amici's interpretations of the rulings, represent a new and novel doctrine. Moreover, even in regard to soliciting agents of insurance companies these
rulings would not be controlling in this State. This court
has held such agents be in "employment" under the
workmen's compensation law. Commercial Casualty Co.

v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 359, 266 P. 721. However, we seriously question whether the opinion <?ited on
page 7 of the brief of amici is representative or typical
of "at least twenty-four states' jurisdiction" or that it
even represents the present position of ·the Delaware
agency.
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In the absence .of disclosure of facts involved and
the circumstances .surrounding the issuance of the administrative determinations upon which amici rely, it
cannot be accepted as a fact that final administrative action is represented by either the Delaware quotation or
the other unJisdosed rulings which amici allege to have
in their possession. Certainly a statement beginning,
"In my .opinion, * * * ", as does the Delaware statement quoted on page 27 of the amici brief, ~would indicate
that some individual is expressing a .personal opinion on
the law rather than that the pronouncement \Vas a formal
ruling by an administrative agency. As a matter of fact,
contrary to the contentions of amici, as far as the Industrial Commission of this state has been able to determine,
the Delaware Unemployment Compensation Commission
as well as the other agencies administering unemployment compensation laws which contain the "A" "B"
"C" provisions have interpreted such provisions as extending the scope of coverage under their laws beyond
that of the common law master-servant relationship. In
an .official interpretation of the Delaware unemployment
compensation law, issued on August 17, 1937, the Delaware Unemployment Compensation Commission interpreted the lavY as follows:
"II.

What is l1Jmployment1

''A. It! ore than the rnaster-servant relationship. (Section 2 (i) (1) and (5) )-Every service
performed by an individual for wages or under
any contract of l1ire is employment covered by the
Law with the exception .of certain services ex-
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plaincd in 1Scdion li-B, following. Usually it
will not br~ difJ'icult to dctcnnim~ what \Yorkers
are coYcrcd by the Law. The term 'employment'
includes all t>ervi (:cs md speci fir· ally exclmled hy
the Law rendered by those workcr::i who stand in
the master-servant rclatiouship io tlw employer.
This term, however, inl'lnrlcs scrvicc~s whid1 may
be rcudcrcrl by incliviclnals who arc not usm1lly
regarded as employees and "·hose relationsl1ip to
the I·~MPLOYEH may not be !he legal relationship of master and servant. 'l'hc services of all
individuals arc inelucled unless it has been established to the satisfadion ,of the Commission that
auy suC'lt incliviuual has been aml will coutinnc
to be free from C'ontrol or diredion over the perfonnancc of his serviees, lJoth under his contract
.of service and in fact. Snch smTiec, 'ho\\·ever,
mnst be perfo rmecl either on tsi cle the usun 1 conrsc
of the husincss or outside of all the plnees of lmsiness of the entm·prise for which tsueh service i8
performed. And eaeh sueh individual nmst customn rily he enp;aged in an independcn ily esin hlished 1rade, oeeupation, profession or lmsiuess. ''
(Sec CCH Uuemploymcnt Immrauec Servicc>, Delaware, Vol. 2, Sel'. 8002.02, p. 11 ,50;).)
This interpretation has not been revoked and was
fono.~wed in an opiniou of the General Counsel of that

agency published as a general guide to the iuterpretntion
of the Delaware law.

This opinion of the General Coun-

sel of the Delaware agcmey dealt with a situation not unlike that presented in this cnse.

The .opinion rends as

follows:
",'-J'fa.tnnent of Facts: '!'he M Com pan)' opL>rntPs a retail grocery store. ~\moug other indi\'lduals, they ('lllploy a man to solicit on1ers. The
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comlitlons of this man's employment arc set forth
by the {'ompany as follows :
(1) Compensation computed on a comm1sswn

basis;
(2) Has no drawing account;
( 3) Has no fixed hours of work;
(4) Solicits orders from people of his own
selection;
(5) Only store work required of him is that he
fill from the company's stock such orders
as he may obtain;
( 6) Is free to work for others if he chooses.
''Advice is requested as to whether or not this
individual's earnings should be included in total
taxable pay roll for unemployment compensation.

"Opinion: Section 2(i)(5) of the Delaware
Unemployment Compensahon Law provides that:
''Services performed by an individual for
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject
to this Act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that"(A) such individual has been and >vill continue t.o be free from control or direction over the
performance of such services, both under his contract of service and in fact; and
"(B) such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for v.~hich such service is
performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places ,of business of the enterprise
for ~which such service is performed; and
" (C) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established tmde, occupation, profession, or business.
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"It will be noted that these paragraphs of
the above-quoted section are j.oined by the conjunction 'and', and must be read together as one
long sentence. Therefore all the conditions referred to must be present concurrently in order
to establish the relati.onship of independent contractor. In our opinion, this relationship in the
instant case fails specificall.r to meet the test imposed by paragraph (B) in that a portion of this
individual's service is performed on the premises
of the employer in filling the orders he has obtained. rrlms, the service is neither outside the usual
eourse of business of the M Company nor wholly
outside of all its places of business. Somewhat
analogous eases arising under the workmen's c.ompensation laws of this State hold that the Industrial Aec~ident Board has jurisdiction mHlPr
similar eireumstances. In addition, it has not been
shown to the sa tisfaetion of the Commission that
the individual in questiou is engaged in an independently established trade or occupation. On
the basis of the facts submitted, it is held that
this individual is an employee of the :M Company,
and his earnings must be included in total pay
roll for tax purposes. * * *" (!See CCH Unemployment Insurance Service, Delaware, Vol. 2,
See. 2002.02.)

Practically every jurisdietion having the "A" "B"
"C" provisions have issued statements and interpretations similar to that issued by the Delaware Commission.
See, for examples, Commerce Clearing Honse, Unemployment Compensation Service, Georgia, page 14,503; Wyoming, page 55,503;
page 45,518.

~Wisconsin,

page 52,029-2; Tennessee,

The statement of the Tennessee agency

contains the following:
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"Thus the term 'employment' covers all servi.ce
rendered by those individuals who stand in the
master-servant relationship to you, and all other
individuals who perform service for you, unless
it has been established to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that:
1

( 1) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction ,over the
performance of said service both under his contract of service and in fact; and
(2) Such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for which said service is
performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business ·Of the enterprise
for whieh said service is performed; and
(3) Such individual is customarily engaged
in [an] independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.''
These examples do not exhaust the list .of state unemployment compensation agencies which have ruled that
the "A" "B" "C" criteria extend the scope of coverage under their laws beyond the master-servant relationship. As a matter of fact, the Industrial Commission
has been unable to find any ruling representing final
admiuistrat,ive action which has not taken such a position.
A complete answer to amici's assertion that the
court should reverse its holding in this case in order to
follow a ruling of the Bureau ·Of Internal Revenue is the
fact that there is nothing in

~he

record, nor even in the

assertions made in the briefs, to indicate that the Bureau
of Internal Revenue has ruled on the status of Thomas or
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on the status of any of the other salesmen employed by
the company. 1\\l:ould amici regard a ruling by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue holding that the relatiousllip between Thomas and the company is employment
for the purposes of ihe Federal Unemployment Tax Act
or the Federal Olcl Age Insurance Tax Act as removiug
all objecti,ons to the inclusion of such relationship within
the terms of the Utah law~ Do not the rompany and
amici take the position that administrative rulings of the
Industrial Commission of this State should be ignored i~
determining the status of persons performing services
for others, and that coverage under the act should be
determined by some undisclosed rulings of another
agency "When in fact the position of the Utah agency is
consistent with that of ,other State agencies having
similar lavvs? Do not amici and the company take the
position that this court should reverse its holding and
disregard the administrative determinations made by
the Industrial Commission of t his State in order to follow what amici assert are determinations of other State
agencies, \vhen such rulings have, insofar as this company is concerned, not been issued, lack finality, and may
1

not even be binding upon the agencies which issued

them~

In considering the foregoing questions, we should
not overlook the fact that the cases now pending in the
courts of otiher jurisdictions indieate that the administrative agencies of jurisdictions having unemployment compensation laws which contain definitions of employment
similar to the one in the Utah law, have taken the posi-
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tion that such definitions extend the scope of coverage
of their laws beyond the common Jaw relationship of
master and serv,ant, else these suits would not exist.
·wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, supra; Bonifas-Gormarn Lumber
Co. v. Michigarn Unemployment Compensation Commission (Circuit Court, Keweenaw County, Michigan);
Brindley-Roth, Inc. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation (Cir.c·uit Court, Wayne County, Michigan) ;
Mid-American Company, Ban,krupt (UiSDC, So. Dist.,
N. Div. of Illinois); Hearst Consolidated Publications,
Inc. v. Huiet & Cruce, (super. Ct. DeKalb County,
Georgia); Memphis Commercial Appeal v. Bryant, Chancery (Davidson County, Tennessee).
A fundamental reason why the scope of coverage under the Federal Act docs not express the ultimate limits
of coverage under the Utah unemployment compensation
law, is that the Federal Employment Taxing Act (£ormerly Title IX of the Social Security Act) docs not con-

tain any provisions resembling those in section 19 ( j) ( 5)
of the Utah law.

The definition of employment in the

Federal Act, section 1607 (c)

of the Internal Rev-

enue Code (formerly section 907(c) of the Social Security Act) as it eXiisted at the time of the enactment
of the Utah unemployment compensation law, was as
follows:
"The term 'employment' means any service of
whatever nature, performed within the United
States by an employee for an employer, except-"
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and there follows a list of exceptions similar to those in
section 19 (j) ( 6) of the Utah law. The 1939 amendments
to the Social Security Act, although amending the exemptions from the scope of coverage of the Federal law,
do not change this definition of employment. The inclusion in the Utah statute of the exceptions to "employment" originally set forth in the Social Security
Act, makes it evident that the Utah legislature had before it for consideration the definition of "employment"
in the Social Security Act, but that it rejected such
definition of "employment'' in favor of a definition
which is entirely unlike anything found in the Federal
Act. If the Utah legislature had adopted the Federal
definition of "employment", it might be claimed that
the construction thereof by the Bureau of Internal Revenue was pertinent to a construction of the Utah act;
hut even this proposition ~would be debatable.
The significant fact concerning the relationship between the State and Federal laws is that the Utah legislature did not adopt the lj'ederal definition of employment but chose to define ''employment'' by reference to
the criteria in section 19 (j) ( 5) of the law-and consequently, neither the regulati,ons of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue nor the interpretations of the Federal Act by
that agency can properly be regarded as defining the
limits to be placed on the defined term "employment"
in the Utah law. The definition of "employment" in
the Utah act does not follow the definition of "employment" in title IX of the Federal Act. Instead it sets
up a definition which is broader in scope than any

105
common law concept and when faced with the proposal
to return to a commou law test rejected it. (see p. 58,
supra.) This fact alone should be sufficient to show intention of the legislature to extend the coverage of the
act beyond the scope of the Federal Act. But it oven
went further and adopted other provisions which do
not parallel any provisions of the Federal law.
Section lU (i) ( 2) On and ( 4) group various enterprises, not subject to the Federal tax, for the purpose
of coverage under tho State act, and under these provisions many enterprises, not subject to the Federal
tax, are suhjoet to tho State law. Also, the Federal Act defines ''employer'' to include only those
meeting cortaiu requirements ''during the taxable
year" which is defined as a calendar year. Section 19(i)(5) of the State law defines a covered employer
iu ienm; that include those meeting certain requirements
iu either the caloudar or the "preceding calendar year".
Under section 8 of the State law, oven though an employing unit does not meet coverage requirements in the
calendar year, it may be required to pay contributions
to tho State for such year if its employment experience
during tho preceding year met the requirements or if it
failed to file certain notices with tho Commission. No
such provision is found in the Federal law. Section
8(c) of the State act provides for the voluntary election
of coverage, and this is also not found in the Federal Act.
These sections definitely indicate the independence of
approach to questions of coverage by the Utah legislature, and demonstrate that the scope of coverage under
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the State law was not intended to be limited to that of
the Federal law.
Further, the ]'ederal Act does not purport to fix the
scope of coverage of State unemployment compensation
laws. Underlying amici's entire argument with respect
to rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and other
State agencies is the misconception that Congress, in
enacting title IX of the Social Security Act, intended to
limit the scope of coverage of State laws to that provided under the Federal law. Unquestionably, the Federal law was intended to act as an incentive for the
enactment of State unemployment compensation laws,
but the very purpose of having a Federal-State system
rather than a single Federal system was to enable the
States to adopt their laws to local conditions. The legislative reports to Congress on the Social Security Act
emphasi7:es that, but for compliance with a few standards set forth in section 303 (a) of the Social Security
Act and section 1603(a) of the Federal Employment Tax
Law, (formerly section 903(a) of the Social Security
Act) the States were free to determine the scope of coverage under their laws.

The Senate Report contains

the following:
"Exeept for a few standards which are necessary to render certain that the state unemployment compensation laws are genuine unemployment compensation acts and not merely relief
measures, the states are left free to set up any
unemployment compensation system they wish,
without dictation from \Vashington." (Senate
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Report No. 628, Calendar No. 661, 74th Congress,
First Session.)
The House of Representatives' report contains this
statement:
''The bill permits the states wide di,scretion with
respect to the unemployment compensahon laws
they wish to enact." ( 1!. R 74th Congress, First
Session, Report No. 615.)
None of the standards to which State acts must conform
in order to be approved by the Social Security Board
relate to the scope of coverage of the State acts. The
Social Security Board in its pamphlet, "Unemployment
Compensation-What and Why" (Publication No. 14,
Govemment Printing Office, March 1937) discusses the
provisions a State law must have for approval under
the Federal Act and states (p. 33):
'' Dcfinit,ions of who shall cot/tribute to the State
fum,d, the amount anrl duration of benefits, eligibility requiremenh;, and similar questions, arc
all left e1dircly to the discretion of the States in
formulating their own laws." (Italics supplied.)

The wide variation in the provisions of State unemployment compensation laws approved by the Social Security Board indicates that no conformity of coverage
was required or effected. The variance in State unemployment compensation laws is reported in "A Comparison of State Unemployment Compensation Laws" issued
by the Soeial Security Board on August 1, 1938.

This

comparison based on the State laws then in force shows
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that of the 48 State laws, and laws of the District of
Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii, 29 cover employers of
eight or more for twenty weeks or more in a calendar
year; 9 cover employers of four or more for the same
period; 10 eover employers of one or more, and the
other laws cover employers of varying numbers of
persons for varying periods of time. These laws also
vary as to the length of time the employer remains
liable for contributions. Unlike the provisions of the
Federal Act, 47 of ihe laws provide that the employer
once liable shall continue to be liable for contributions
for the whole of the calendar year in which he becomes
subject and through the succeeding calendar year. One
State extends liability on a <ruarterly basis, and 3 treat
liability aeeruiug in the early years of their operation
in a manner which is different from the treatment of
liability in the latter years of operation. Variations
likewise occur in the treatment of subsidiaries and
separate establishments under joint control. Variations
occur in the definition of employment. Thirty-three
laws, as a part of the definition of employment, contain
the statutory criteria set forth in section 19 (j) (5) of
the State law. The Alabama and Oregon laws contain
the first and third criteria and Iowa the first only.
Connceticut defines coverage in terms of the masterservant relationship.

The Kentucky law defines cover-

age in terms of the employer-employee relationship.
'J'he foregoing examples of variations in State
laws arise not out of interpretation of such laws,
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but from express provisions of the laws and by
no means exhaust the variations among the provisions
of such laws. The benefit provisions ,of the laws show
as great or greater variations than those found in the
contribution provisions of the laws. All of these laws
are approved laws. In Steward Machine Co. v. Dav,is,
301 U. S. 548, the court, in denying that the Federal
law called for the surrender of the independence of
the States, said:
''A wide range of judgment is given to the several
states as to the particular type of statute to be
spread on their hooks.''

It is apparent, therefore, that the States not only may,
but have, determined the scope ,of coverage of their laws
and that uniformity of coverage between the State and
the Federal Acts was not contemplated by either Congress or the State legislatures.
Only one further contention of amici on the relationship of the State law to the Federal law need be mentioned. Amici asserts that secti,on 11(1) of the state
law which deals with "State Federal Reciprocal Benefit
Arrangements" indicates a legislative intent to restrict
the scope of the .statutory definition of employment contained in section 19 (j) ( 5). This section is directed
primarily to a solution of the administrative problems
created by transitory and multi-state workers. The
section authorizes neither an extension nor a restriction
of the legislative definition ·of employment. Cooperation
between Federal and State agencies with respect to
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unemployment compensation .is designed only to insure
that State laws comply with certain minimum standards
set forth in section i~03(a) of the Federal Act so that
the State may continue to qualify for grants under title
III of the Social Security Act to cover expenses ,of
administration, and with the conditions of section 1603
(a) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Law, to assure
that the credit against the Federal tax is allowed only
under a bona fide State unemployment compensation law.
Further cooperation between State agencies is designed
to solve some of the problems of multi-state workers. But
these requirements do not affect the scope of coverage ·Of
State laws. State discretion in this respect is not only
highly desirable but necessary when we recall that the
State and not the Federal Government has the responsibility ,of obtaining coverage broad enough to insure the
payment of benefits with respect to unemployment.

VI.
TH18 COURT DID NOT ERR IN

DI'~CLARING

THAT THE ISSUE

IN THIS CASE WAS TO DETERMINE WHE.THER THE EVID.I!JNC.I!J WAS SUCH AS TO SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION
WAS ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE IN NOT FINDING
THAT TH.I!J RELATIONSHIP BETWI<]EN

THE

CLAIMANT

AND THE COMPANY COMPLIED WITH THE THHEE TESTS
8.1!JT FORTH IN SECTION 19 (j) (5).

The brief filed by amici curiae argues that the court
erred in limiting its review of the Industrial Commission's decision to a determination of whether, from the
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record, the decision of the Commission was arbitrary or
unreasonable. In support of this contention amici curiae
urge that the existence of the employment relation
between the company and the claimant is a "jurisdictional fact'' capable of determination ·only by courts and
hence, .such a determination by the Industrial Commission is subject to redetermination by this court on
the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. Amici
curiae do not make clear the extent to which such an
independent review of the facts by the court would affect
the result in this case, but refer to certain workmen's
compensation cases as illustrating the "jurisdictional
fact'' doctrine.
In this state, the leading case on the "jurisdictional
fact'' doctrine, and the one m1 which most of the others
are based, is Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans,
52 Utah 394, 174 Pac. 825, decided under a statute that
provided:
''The Commission shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction pertaining to the payment of
compensation and benefits, and its decision thereon shall he final, * * *" (J1Jmphasis by the
court).
In that case the court pointed out that the statutory
provision expressly referred to ''payment of compensation and benefits." It also assumed that the claimant
and the employer came within the scope ,of the act. But
apparently because of the qualification in the statute,
"within its jurisdiction", the court was of the opinion

112
that the provision did not purport to lend finality to any
deeision of the Industrial Commission on what was
deemed to be ''jurisdictional'' facts. The court then
enumerated three such facts: (1) \Vhether the claimant was ·within the scope of the coverage of the act;
(2) ·whether the injury arose in the course of employment; and (3) ·whether, in cases of death, the claimant
was a dependent of the deceased. The court was of
the ,opinion that as to these facts the statute did not
make the administrative findings conclusive.

It is not entirely clear whether, in this respect,
the Evans ease and those based upon it clearly reflect
the present state of the law. It should be noted that
under the Utah workmen's eompensation statute as
amended (Revised Statutes 1933, sections 42-1-79, 42-180; Sessions Laws of 1921, p. 165, section 1348), there
are decisions by this court, as well as by courts of other
jurisdictions having similar statutes, ·which hold that
a finding by the Industrial Commission that a claimant
is a covererl employee, or that the injury arose in the
course of the employment, or that the claimant is a
"dependent" of the deceased, is conclusive upon the
court if it is supported by competent evidence and it is
not arbitrary or unreasonable, Colonial Build-ing & Loan
Ass'n v. Indu,strial Cmnmission, 85 Utah 65, 38 P. (2d)
737; Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 57
Utah 246, 194 P. 122; Chase v. Industrial Commission,
81 Utah 141, 17 P. (2d) 205; Ntamanakis v. Industrial
Commission, 67 Utah 197, 246 P. 706; Jlavalinakis v.
Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 196, 246 P. 698; cf. as
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to a finding of the employment relation, Roman Catholic
A t·chbishop v. Industrial Accident Commission, 194 Cal.
660, 230 P. 1; Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Idaho
707, 218 P. 356; index 1lfines Corp. v. Industrial ComJnission, 82 Colo. 272, 259 Pac. 1036; Emack's Case, 232
Mass. 396, 123 N. E. 86; But see Miller v. Industrial
Commission, (Utah 1939), 92 P. (2d) 342.
But irrespective of these decisions and regardless
of the seope of judicial review in workmen's compensation cases of the issue of '' emp}oyment' ', the nature of
court review of the Industrial Commission's finding of
"employment" for benefit purposes under the unemployment compensation law has been dearly limited by the
lcgisla t ure in section 19 ( j) ( 5) of the law. Thus we are
faced at the outset with the first part ,of section 19(j) (5)
whieh provides:
''Services performed by an individual for wages
or under any eontract of hire, vvrittcn or oral,
express or implied, shall be dc(mwd to be employment subject to this act unless and ~tntil it is
slunrn to the satisfaction of the commission
* ~, *'' (Italics supplied).
By this provision the legislature has designated the
agency or tribunal to determine the existcnec of facts
satisfying the three criteria upon which exclusion from
the law shall be based. The only position taken here is
that the provision expresses the clear legislative intentim1 that the findings of the Industrial Commission with
respect to the existence of "employment", so long as
they arc not unreasonable or arbitrary on the basis of
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the record, shall not be disturbed. It should also be
noted that none of the statutes inv,olved in the workmen's compensation cases attempted in any way to vest
expressly and as completely in the administrative agency
the power to determine whether or not the covered employment relationship existed. This difference in the
statutes is but another example of the legislative purpose to adopt for the unemployment compensation program concepts and procedures unlike those employed
under workmen's compensation laws, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the difficulties in administering the latter, difficulties with which this court is familiar, (Kavalinakis v. Indu.strial Commission, 67 Utah
196; 246 P. 698, 701) contributed substantially to the
adoption of the more precise and effective methods under
the unemployment compensation law.
Finally, it need only be pointed out that neither the
Federal Constitution nor that of Utah prohibits the legislature from limiting the scope of judicial review of
findings of even so-called jurisdictional facts, at least
as long as unreasonable or arbitrary findings are subject
to judicial correction, Utah Fuel v. Industrial Commis-

sion, 57 Utah 246; 194 P. 122, 124; People v. Globe Grain
and Millinp Co., 211 Cal. 121, 294 P. 3; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589; St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v.
U. S., 298 U. S. 38, 50-52; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S.
505; Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metall,ic Door Co., 256 N.Y.
199, 176 N. E. 141 aff'd 284 U. S. 594; Shields v. Utah

Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177.
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The rule that the legislature may limit the scope of
judicial review to the reasonableness of findings by an
administrative tribunal which it appointed to act with
respect to matters within the province of the legislature
(see St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. U.S., 298 U. S. 38, 51)
is ably summarized in lleetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505
in which the United States Supreme Court quoted the
following language from the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Utah in People v. Jlasbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 305:
"The objection that the statute attempts to confer
judicial power ~on the hoard is not well founded.
Many executive officers, even those who are spoken of as purely ministerial oflicers, act judicially
in the determination of facts in the performance
of their official duties; and in so doing they do
not exercise 'judicial power', as the phrase is
c;ommonly used, and as it is used in the organic
act in conferring judicial power upon specified
courts.''
As the legislature was free to establish the conditions under which employing units shall be exempt from
coverage, and to declare that benefits shall be paid or
denied in accordance with establishment ,of those conditions, it could enlist the aid of an administrative
agency to determine the question of fact whether a
particular relationship satisfied the conditions for exception and could make that factual determination, after
hearing and upon evidence, conclusive. Shields

Utah
Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 180; Virginia Railway Co.
v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 663, St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38, 51.

V'.
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These views are m substance similar to those expressed by the Supreme Courts of North Carolina and
Colorado in Industrial Cornrn:ission of the State of Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra,
and Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra.
Both courts recognized that the scope of judicial review
under pr,ovisions of law, like those in sections 19 ( j) ( 5)
and (6) of the law of this State, was limited to a determination of the reasonableness of the Commission's position, and that the legislatures of both North Carolina and
Colorado could so limit the scope of judicial review.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH CIIEL';,

Attorney General,
S. D.

HUI<~FAKER,

Assistant Attorney General,

A. M. F'ERRO,
Special Assistant Attorney
General.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DIVISION
OCT 31 1936

SIXTH FLOOR UNION PACIFIC BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

EMPLOYERS STATUS REPORT

or

all employers and employing units regardless of number
employees and whether or not subject to the
Unemployment Compensation Luw of Utah

o be returned within ten (10) days to the Unemployment Compensation Division, Sixth Floor
Union PBA:ific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.
1.
2.

Business name of employing unit .....GLQBE.... GRAlli .. A.NJL!flLLI.IE/.... C.O.MI'ANY....................
...............................
Business headquarters in Utah ........................................................ Ogde.n.....
..........................................Yit'.b.e.r..................

3.

Location of separate establishments where business is carried on in Utah (for each such location describe fully exact nature
of business and list each separate type of business) .... Tr.e.mo.nt.on,... Lo.g_an, .. S.alt.... La.k:e .. Ci.~.•........................

(City or Town)

(County)

S_prip_gy1.lli ....~....S.II.l.e."'.. w.<.>.x:e.h.o.uae a. . Lwnpo, .. .Niphi, .JfJil.laville, .. H.y:ruo,.
L.!!'lll.fl.too... ~ ..E:uyin8 ... gra1.n.•...
4.

List of principal products manufactured or traded in.. __ F_lOUI ..... O.'t.h~.l" ___ _gr~_i_n._

prod.:UC..'to.EJ ...... F.~_e:d .. _ ...&;_

G_rll.i!1__, ___ ..

C.o.n.o..mt..i.o.n.
-···--·--- ------ ···-·······-- ........ - ---.
(Individual, lloJXtnership, corporation, t:tc.)

6.

Type of organization

6.

Date of organi,.tion ..Q.:ualifi.id ... in.U.tah

..

'7.

Predecessor, if any, from whom business was acquired

8.

Date acqu~red .
.. ···························-··-·······-·--·-············-········· ...... ···-····--·--···-··············--------···········--·--....
-----·-······················· ~
Is the busmess of the employing unit named in Item 1 ovtm'cl or conb·olled by another company or individual, whether by

. .tto.v.ember . .29.•.. 1.~1113.• .........................................................

(If a coqmratlon, gl,;e ~nato of Incorporation ancl (latt> (•f in"Ol por,dh.n, (•r Qtuliifl<:atlon to do buslne!ls In the State)

(AnS\\(·r· (lniy if busrness WUt; acquired since the

N0

legally enforcible means or otherwise?.

beginn1n~o;

_.. .. . .. ..... .....

.

(Yes or

................................ .

I '1
t~-~---~-~-~l~yment 0~---~-~-~~---~-=~~:-~~---~:~-~--=~~--~@~. \ tJ
..... _ . ................ .

no)

~! :~·e g~:t~:er:I::~ :add:d:;e~:eo:0:~~~l~i~:r;~~P::~.~~-~-~~ -~~e~l

.. er

................................

················-·--·····-··········--··········································

············-······----··········-······-·······································-·················-······--·······

(a)

............. .

<•f the prcced1ng cakndar }'tear)

Does such controlling company own or control any other employing unit?

......... ·········-··{y~-~--~~--~~)

'

······•

'

.

.....................

If so, give the names and addresr-es of each .

9.
10.

Average weekly nun:. her of employees in employment in Utah t0 date in lh(' currrnt calendar year ........ ll~Do you claim exemption as a "corporation, community ehest, fuild, or foundation, organized nnd operated exclusively for religious, chn.ritable, scicnlific, literary, or educational purposes, or for tLc prevention o! cruelty to children or animals, no part
of the net earnings of whieh inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual?" ........

.NO. .. .

.(If
11.

12.

(a)

..

···················a.,.,.,

······················-~"'"''
"~~t-1

t;o, folluw ln,;tru<"t1on 6 Implicitly.)

!1 you Lelieve that the provisions of the law do not make you subject to it, Jo you wish to elect to be subject to con-";")'0

trrt.i'O'tions and to have your employees become eligible for bPnefits? ·····-.............. ·····-···············-------················ · ' t
0
(b) If you be1ieve that you are subject to the law, but that e~rk'l.in of your employees <:.re performing- services of exempted:o~g
types, do ycu wish to elect to make ALL of your employees st:bj(;~t to the Ia>.-?
.................. ''-~
Do you believe that the nature and extent of employment in your Lusiness during the preceding calendar year and U> date in
the current calendar year was such as to make you lJU!Jle, under the provisio:1s of the Utah Unemployment Compensation

fY

13.

Law, for contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund e~.tnbli:-,hed
ti1at Law? ........... Y_e_;:,_ --················--·-·············-·
Name, adclre~>s nnd title of c.fficial who will fumish payroll d:>.ta. If different of:f;cials at differe-nt locations, give names,
addresses and titics
L_• J.L. S.i.e.ve.ns...... Ogde_n,, __ Utah._ •.. C~ah ..i0X ._ __

_...,--

...~ ...

Use ar,d attaeh extra sheet in answering any question, if more space i~ required.
Datc .. .llPV.~!ll.R.~T ... 9. H 36....
Name of e'"PiOJ''rl •

By
Officwl

2:"0·· ..• \lb.IJ .....G:r?,i.P .. JillJ,L !Jill.m.g
c;''. ' ~_.AA..<./V\c~ ···- ..
positio:J t.:/ ____ C .s.biel: ...

IF THE EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYING UNIT DOES NOT FEI.:!".J THAT HE IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW AND DOES NOT
WISH TO ELECT TO BE SUBJECT TO IT, BUT IS NOT CLAI~:lNG EXEt.fPTION UNDER QUESTION 10 ABOVE, THE
REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM MUST BE FILLED OUT AS HlS CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION.
From the Unemployment Compensation La\\:
Section 16 (b). Penalty: " • • "' Any officer or agent of an emp!Gying unit • • • who fails or refuses to make
any such contributions, • * • or to furnish any reports required !1ereunder, or to produw or permit the im:pection or copying of reconls, as required hereunder, shall be punished by a fine of not less th<Jn $20.00 nor more than $200.00, or by i:nprisonment for not longer th~n .sixty days, or by both • • • ar.d eaeh such false st<..tement r•r rcpre."ent.ation or failure to disclose
a material fact • • • shail conslit".Jte a separate offense."

I hereby certify that the foregoing 0tatus neport is a true and
correct copy of t.l"ie original StHtus Report filed by the Globe Grain
and ;~1illing Company, on November 10, 1936, with the Department of
Pl&cement and Unemployment Inf.urance of the Industri&l Commission of

"'~-

~V1,~~
Industrial Commission of Utah

co.
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EXHIBIT B.
No. 14591.
Colorado Public \V elf are Board,
Plaintiff in Error,

I

v.
Edmond L. Viles,
Defendant in Error.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Error to the Distriet Court of the City
and County of Denver.
Ron. George F. Dunklee, Judge .
.JUDGxfENT REVERSED IN PART.
Ron. Byron G. Rogers, Attorney General.
Mr .•Joseph D. Iskow, Assistant Attorney General.
Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.
Mr. Edmond L. Viles, Pro se.

Mr. Justiee Burke delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, alleging that he was entitled to a pensi,on because
of blindness, brought mandamus against plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the board, to eompel the
allowance thereof. An alternative writ was issued to
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which the board demurred on the ground ''that the court
had no jurisdiction ,of the person of the respondent or
the subject of the action." That demurrer was overruled, the board elected to stand, and to review the
judgment entered accordingly it brings error.
A number of propositions are argued in the brief,s
but from the foregoing it is clear that the only question
before us is the question of jurisdiction.
Mandamus is the proper remedy ''to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office.
Sec. 342, chap. 30, Vol. 1, '35 C. S. A.
From the petitim1 it appears that plaintiff made the
necessary application to the county director, was examined and his case referred to the board which determined
that he was eligible except that the board "did not
believe the reports of the three optholmologists above
mentim1ed.'' And this under section 37 to 50, inclusive,
chap. 22, vol. 2, 'i~5 C. S. A. Therefrom it appears
that the duty devolved upon the county director and the
board to have a fair hearing, consider all the facts and
circumstances and make award aceordingly, in any event
not to exceed a total of $30.00 per month. Thus the
duty to exercise discretion, and the ba,sis and limits of
that discretion are specified by law. From tho complaint
we learn that all the evidence and all the facts and
circumstances established that plaintiff was entitled
to relief which was denied, "arbitrarily, and unrea-
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~sonably

and capriciously", without shadow of excuse
except that the board paid no attention to its own witnesses. It is thus sufficiently made clear that the hoard
ignored the hearing and exercised no discretion, and that
the holding of the district court was correct.
In the record before us is the so called answer of
the board. ~We ignore it for two reasons. First, because it is an answer to the petition instead of to the
alternative writ.
Chipman v. Forward, 41 Colo. 442; 92 Pac. 913.
Second, because that answer did not enter the judgment
of the district court and is not involved in the question
before us.

Ii is said no statutory court review is provided. The
district court under its general jurisdiction, and this
court by writ of error under its constitutional powers,
may review the acts of any board or commission where
it is contended that legal rights have been denied, or that
such body is vested with a discretion which it refuses to
exercise.
It is further urged that this is not an action to
compel the exercise of discretion, but to control that
discretion, because plaintiff makes demand for the maximum ~statutory allowance. vY e look to the substance of
the petition and are not conholled by the prayer. If
his demand was excessive the question was one for answer, not demurrer.
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The alternative writ required the board to pay $30.00
per month or show cause. The final judgment was
simply that the writ be made peremptory. As to
the payment the judgment is erroneous. The refusal
of the board to exercise discretion neither vested
the eourt with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to the
max1mum. The mandate should have been to act.
The demurrer \vas properly ·overruled, but for the
last mentioned reason the judgment is amended and it is
ordered that the cause he considered by the hoard, its
discretion exercised as demanded hy statute, and disposition be made accordingly .
.Mr. Chief .Justice Hilliard and

Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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EXHIBIT C.

43
STATE OF WISCONSIN
CIRCUIT COURT

-

DANE COUNTY

WISCONSIN BRIDGE & IRON
COMPANY, (Unemployment
reserve account of), a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMMISSION
OF WISCONSIN and ROY
RAMSEY, ROBERT GEHRT,
BUD W. LIPSCOMB, and
FRED AHL,
Defendants.
Before lion. Alvin C. Reis, .Judge.
DECISION.
BY THE COURT:
These are aetions to review Industrial Commission
orders under the Unemployment Compensation Act.
They involve the eligibility for unemployment benefits
of the four eo-defendants named.
We say at the outset that the complaint in the Ahl
case should be dismissed for the obvious reason that
the commission's order was in plaintiff's favor; and,
although plaintiff may not agree with some finding or
conclusion expressed by the commission, there is not
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order of which it can complain in this case (the fourth
above).
The conception of "employe "-under the Unemployment Compensation Act-is said by these cases to be
presented for the first time to a

~Wisconsin

court.

The

commission maintains that employment, under this statute, has a much different meaning from that attributed
to the term in the workmen's copensation law.
Sec. 108.02 ( 5) (a) of the Wisconsin Unemployment
Compensation Act reads :
"(5) El\1PLOYMENT. (a) ':BJmployment',
subjeet to the other provisions of this subsection,
means any service performeu by an individual for
• pay, including service in. interstate commerce,
under any eontraet of servH·e for pay or contract
of hire, written or oral, express ,or implied, whether such inuividual 's c·ontract was directly made
with and paid by the employer or through a person in his employ, provided the employer had
actual or constructive knowledge or such contract; and each individual thus engaged by any
employer to perform services for pay shall for the
purpose of this chapter be treated as in an 'employment', unless and until the employer has
satisfied the connnission that such individual has
been and will eontinue to be free from the employer's control or direction over the performance ,of his work both under his contrac·t of service
and in fact, and that such work is either outside
the usual course of the employer's enterprise
or performed outside of all the employer's places
of business, and that such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, business, profession or occupation."
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The attorneys for the plaintiff company and for
the defendant commission are, to a great extent, at cross
purposes as to what constitutes the issue in these cases.
They do agree that the question presented is essentially one of law, not whether evidence supports a particular finding or findings of fact. Counsel for the commission stated in oral argument that the case offered a
"legal proposition". Plaintiff's attorneys so contend
in their brief (p. 42 seq.).
The question concerns the status as "employe"
of 'one Drews, to whom the plaintiff "Wisconsin Bridge
& Iron Company allegedly sub-let a contract. If Drews
is the "employe" of \Visconsin Bridge & Iron Company,
then concededly the co-defendants-Ramsey, Gehrt and
Lipscomb-arc employes of the company, and admittedly
are entitled to unemployment 0ompensation benefits out
of its reserve.
Referring to Drews, plaintiff's brief expresses the
gist of its position by the statement (p. 44) that ''if the
Court is of the opinion that he was an independent contractor as a matter of law, then the decision of the commissi,on must be reversed

"

This is not conceded by the commission to be the
issue, however, for in its brief the commission asserts
(p. 31) that "the short and complete answer to plaintiff's position is that independent contractors are not

excluded from coverage under the Unemployment Compensation Act.''
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The question, as we view it, is not whether Drews
became an "independent con'tractor," as that term
is used in a long line of decisions under the workmen's compensation law. The question is whether
he must he regarded, for purposes of these cases, as an
"employe" under the definition in sec. 108.02 ( 5) (a)
of the Unemployment Compensation Act, even though he
may he regarded as an independent contractor for any
other or for all purposes.
This delineation of the issue, if it be sound, renders
it unnecessary to dig·est a great part of the testimony,
whieh has been so painstakingly summarized by plaintiffs counsel in thirty-five pages of brief. Much of the
evideure goes to show that Drews acted as an independent contractor in the instant situation. But that is
not determinative of whether he is an "employe" under
the description in 108.02 (5) (a) of the Unemployment
Compensation Act.
Similarly, the respective counsel are at loggerheads
as to the presumptions respecting "employment" which
108.02 (5) (a) sets up.
Plain tiff's brief ( p. 61) cites the general doctrine
that presumptions "completely disappear when substantial credible evidence is offered rebutting such presumption". The commission's brief, however, (p. 27)
refers to the "unique
procedural aspects" of
108.02 (5) (a) whereby the employer must "as·sume the
burden of proof if he is to prove an exclusion,'' the brief
adding (p. 28):

"The Legislature has substituted for
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the common law presumption (that, in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, an employer-employe relationship exists) a statutory presumption which does not
disappear >vhen thrown into the scale against any evidence but remains to be decisive of the case in the face
of an insufficient showing. The provisiou specifies
that the presumption remains 'unless and until the employer has satisfied the commission.' ''
We concur, that this clause creates a ''unique'' procedure. The presumption i,s neither prima facie (to be
rebutted by some evidence) nor conclusive (and incapable of rebuttal) but persists only "unless and until"
the commission (a) is satisfied (b) by the employer as
to certain facts.
~We

need not anticipate in this decision the attack
which may be made upon a provision requiring that the
commission be satisfied; nor need we explore the ramifications as to what "satisfied" means. Suffice it that in
the instant proceeding there has not been any showing
to demonstrate the third of the three bases of exclusion
made necessary by the statute if the person performing
service for pay is not to be held an employe, namely,
''that such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, business, profession or
occupation
. " (Our italics.)
The very presentation of the divergent views of the
parties in their approach to the legal question herein has
served to crystallize the issue and to reveal, in our
judgment, the foundation upon which the commission's
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orders must be sustained. The Unemployment Compensation Act, in our opinion, has evolved a new concept
of employment-different from that at common law and
broader than the one contained in the workmen's compensation law-and no attempt has even been made to
show that Drews complies with all the tests which must
be met if he is to be excluded as an employe, under the
"unique" procedure provided by sec. 108.02 (5) (a).

vY e adopt from the commission's brief (p. 12) the
following:
"SgCTION 108.02 (5) (a), SUBSTANTIVI~LY
CONSIDERED, SETS UP A NEW CONCEPT OF
'EMPLOYMENT' RELATIONS.
IT COMPREHENDS ALL SERVICES FOR PAY UNLESS THEY
ARE PERFORMED BY A BUSINESS (OR PROFESSIONAL) .MAN IN Tl-IE COURSE OF THE BUSINESS (OR PROFESSION) vVHICH CUSTOMARILY
ENGAGES HIS EFFORTS
'' S cction 108.02 ( 5) (a) establishes a new concept
of employment
. a reference to the legislative
history of the provision removes any doubt as to the
intention of the legislature to break with the traditional
concept of the employment relationship as f,ound in common law and substitute in lieu thereof the new and
unique creation here under consideration, and shows,
furthermore, that this statutory creation was intended to
extend coverage under the Unemployment Compensahon Act.''
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The commission's brief then goes on to point out
that originally the definition of employment under Chapter 108 (Unemployment Compensation) was substantially the same as under Chapter 102 (Workmen's Compensation). The brief continues (p. 13):
"There was an identity in the contemplated coverage in that both Acts defined the term employment as
services performed under a contract of hire. This term
embraced and called into operation the body of common
law principles known as the doctrine ,of master and
servant. A consideration of services that were not
contracts of hire fell outside the scope of the law. Hence,
services performed pursuant to an independent contractor relationship were not within the province of the
Act.''
Pursuant to thiH original contemplation of the Unernployrnen t Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission formulated a rule in which it declared that
persons who \Vere considered independent c~ontractors
under the vVorkmen's Compensation Act were not
''employes'' under the Unemployment Compensation
Act.
This rule 2 read as follows:
'' Pers,ons doing work for an employer as contractors
and Hubcontractors who are deemed independent contractors under the workmen's compensation act shall
also be deemed independent contractors (and not 'employes') within the definition of Chapter 108. of the
Wisconsin Statutes.''
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Then came the 1935 amendments which, ac0ording
to the commission's brief (p. 13), represented a "clean
break'' with the contract of hire concept and substituted
the ''presumptive coverage of all contract services.''
The essential parts of 108.02 ( 5) (a), after the
ameudments of ,June 26, 1935, ~were as follows:
"An 'employment'
shall mean any
persoual service for pay, .
nuder auy contract ,of personal servic~e for pay or eoutraet of
hire . . . ; and each individual engaged by any
employer to perform services for pay shall for
the purposes of this chapter he treated as in an
'emplo~'IIlOnt' unless and until the emplo~'er has
satisf1ecl the eormnission that sueh indiviclual has
lweu and will continue to be free from the employer's control or direction over the performance of his work both under his contract of
service aud in fact, and that such work is either
outside the usual course of tho employer's cuterprise or performed outside of all the employer's
places of business, and that such individual is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, business, profession or occupation;

"
Subsequently, "personal service", as above quoted,
was amended to read simply "service".
From this legislative "evoluti,on" the commission
draws the following conclusion in its brief (p. 15):

"It is subrnittcd that under a proper constntction
of the section coverage of the act is extended to
the performance of aU contracts involving sermces
except in those insta;nces where the services are per-
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formed by a business or professional ma~t~ engaged in his
business or profession. ( 11 owever, even the exception
fails where the performance of the services is so related
to the employer's business as to be in the usual cmtrse
of the employer's enterprise and performed on/ or at the
employer's place of business.)"
For purposes of the present decision, we need not
go into all the points wherein the present legislative
definition of employment departs from prior accepted
standards. For instance, it has been regarded-and
must still be so viewed under the workmen's compensation law-that lack of right to control is what precludes,
in essence, the employment status. But by the first test
of exclusion prescribed in 108.02 (5) (a), it must be
established that there is freedom from control not only
(1) under the contract but also (2) in fact. Furthermore, there must be established not only freedom from
control in the past hut that the individual "will continue
to be free from the employer's eontrol or direction
'' (Our italics).
This prospective outlook and invisioniug of the future lends credence to the broad suggestion made by
the commission's brief (p. 20) herein, namely, that it is
only the ''tradesman, business man or professional man''
as sueh, who is beyond the pale of the Unemployment
Compensation Act.
The principle that there must be not only an independent but a customary and established trade, business
or profession-in order for the individual to be omitted
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from the Unemployment Compensation Act- is emphatically and, in haec verbcL, declared in the third
test of exdusion laid down in 108.02 ( 5) (a), "that such
individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, business, profession or occupation."
This last criterion is decisive of the present cases.
No effort could be made to show that Drews was an
established, customarily engaged entrepreneur in the
constructim1 business. He had been an employe of the
cmnpany for years before the short-termed transaction
here involved. Ife became admittedly the employe of the
company after the transaction here involved. Two and
two simply make four.
Granting that there was a hiatus in which Drews'
relations to the eompany became that of independent
contractor-granting that the alleged subterfuge could
not operate to destroy the independent contractor relationship (York v. Industrial Commission, 223 ~Wis.
140)-still there is no pretense made, and none can be
made, under the undisputed evidence, that Drews wa,s
"customarily" engaged and "established" in the construction business as an independent contractor. No
testimony was offered or even suggested that Drews was
known as a business or professional man or held himself
out to the public as being engaged in the construction
business as an independent and customary profession.
lie had been, and thereafter was, the company's employe.
"\Ve realize that it is quite a jump from the classic
"master and servant" doctrine to the almost horizon-
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less concept of employnient reflected by the present
Unemployment Compensation Act. The rationale behind
this change is plain, however. Unemployment compensation (to use the commission's rather scholarly diction)
is predicated upon the "flow of time" element in
employment whereas tort liability or liability in
the field of workmen's compensation focuses upon
the "instant of time" element. Unemployment reserves
must be accumulated. Employes reap no advantages
until the employer has been subject to contribution provisions for two years. In contrast, the right to recovery
in a workmen's compensation case or for tort may accrue
instantaneously, upon the employment relationship
arising. It is relatively immaterial, in workmen's compensation cases, that empl,oyment is temporary and
ephemeral. But to have an efficient unemployment compensation system, dependence cannot be had upon dayto-day or short-time relationships. There must be reasonable permanence and stability.
The essential nature and quality of the "long pull"
are illustrated in the present cases where the co-defendants, Ramsey, Gehrt and Lipscomb, are not entitled to
benefits if they are employes of Drews because he has
made only six months' contributions rather than the
twenty-four months' contributions demanded by law.
\V e note reliance by plaintiff in this regard on the
circumstance that Drews petitioned to come under the
Act and that such petition was allowed by the commission.

We do not conceive, however, that the adminis-

133
trative act of granting such permission is significant in
determining the present controversy on the merits and
obviously there is no genus of estoppel which can be
arrayed against the commission in this connection.
\V e observe also plaintiff's remonstrance (reply
brief, p. 8) that to adhere to the requirement that one
must be shown to the established and customarily in a
trade, business or p11ofession, before he may be regarded
as uot an employe, is to declare that "once an employe,
always an employe''. Indeed, counsel for plaintiff remarks in closing its main brief (p. 63):
'"l'o deny validity to the independent contractor
relationship ereated in this ease would he to rob the
American citiz.en of his inalienable right to direct
his ·own destiny, to rise to any status he desires, and to
choose whether he prefers compensation protection to
the privilege of engaging in an independent enterprise."
This colorful appeal for the ''inalienable right to
direct his own destiny'' is answered by the cold fact
in this ease that Drews, within five months after he
initiated his assumed destiny, was back with a job in
Kansas on the eompany 's payroll, with his "destiny"
already behind him.
\Ve conclude that Drews was an "employe" of \Viscousin Bridge & Iron Company; from which it followswithout question-that Ramsey, Gehrt and Lipscomb
were its employes.
Counsel for plaintiff raise a jurisdictional point,
to-wit: The Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company peti-
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tioned the commission for review of the so-called ''appeal
tribunal'' decision on September 3, 1938. On September
13, 1938, (within the ten day limit set by statute) the
commission ",set aside" the appeal tribunal's decision.
It was not until October 15, 1938, that the comm1sswn
affirmed the appeal tribunal's decision.
The contention is that, this affirmance not having
been within ten days from the date of the company's
petition, the commission lost jurisdict~on.
The pertinent provision of the Unemployment Compensation Act-108.09 (6) (b)-reads:
"Ji~ither party may petition the commission
for review of an appeal tribunal decision, pursuant to general eommission rules, within ten
days after it was mailed to l1is last known address. Within ten days after ihe filing of such
a petition, the commission may affirm, reverse,
change, or set aside sueh decision, on the basis
of the evidence previously submitted in such ease
or direct the taking of additional testimony. The
failure of the eommission to ad on sneh a petition
within such ten days shall constitute an affirmance
of the appeal tribunal decision.''

This raises the question as to the effect of the commission's action on September 13th (within the ten
day period) in setting aside the appeal tribunal's decision. \V e think that this clearly connotes a suspense
of the decision and a holding of it in statu quo.
Unquestionably and expressly this is the effect of
setting aside (as distinguished from reversing) an examiner's award under the vV orkmen 's Compensation Act
(Chapter 102). However, as plaintiff's counsel points
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out, sec. 102.18 of the workmen's compensation law
specifically states:
"If no petition is filed within twenty days
from 1he date that a copy of the findings or order
of the eommissioner or examiner \Vas mailed to
the last known address of the parties in interest,
such findings or order shall be considered the findings or order of the industrial commission as a
body, unless set aside, reversed or modified by
sueh eommissioner or examiner within such time.
If the findings or order arc set aside by the commissioner or examiner the status shall be the same
as prior to the findings or order set aside." (Our
italics).

By virtue of the legislature having omitted this
precautionary provision in the Unemployment Compensation Ad, counsel for plaintiff maintains that it cannot
be read in, by judicial decree. \Ve acknowledge that
there is persuasiveness in the company's point.
However, we reiterate that-taken by itself and
without any such reservation as was written into the
workmen's compensation law on this point (102.18)-to
''set aside'' must mean something different from '' reverse" and it cannot mean "affirm". The common
acceptance of to "set aside" is that the situation is restored to what it was before and now awaits further
disposition. We so interpret the meaning of "set aside"
in the Unemployment Compensation Act-sec. 108.09
(6)(b).
Having "·set aside" the appeal tribunal decision
on September 13th (within ten days), the commission
effectively held the matter open. Its subsequent affirm-

136
ance on October 15th was therefore an act within its
powers and jurisdiction.
See Milwaukee County v. Industrial Commission,
224 ~Wis. 302.
We need not allude to the hopeless impracticality
of an opposite construction which would require the
Industrial Commission to definitely and finally decide
every case submitted to it within ten days after submission. The task could not humanly be done with intelligence and any appreciable measure of judicious consideration.
The commission's findings and order should be confirmed.
It is so ordered.

The eommission 's attorneys may prepare and submit to opposing counsel the judgment.
Dated March 13, 1939.
I, Paul A. Raushenbush, Director of the Wisconsin
Unemployment Compensation Department, hereby certify that I have compared the attached decision of the
Circuit Court fm Dane County, ~Wisconsin, with the
original on file in the offices of said Department, and
that the same is a true and correct copy of such original.
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 28th day of
March, 1939.
/s/ Paul A. Raushenbush.
Paul A. Raushenbush.
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EXHIBIT D
STATE OF MICHIHAN
THE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY
OF MARQUETTE
PE11 ER POND,
Plaintiff,
VS.

MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and HEINZ LUMBgR
COMPANY,
Defendants.
OPINION OF

THJ1~

No. 13i325

COURT

I have given this case eonsiderable study. The case
came in just at the end of our summer terms and I have
given it a lot of thought and study and I am sure you
won't be offended if I tell you that I feel that I should
dispose of the case now and not wait for briefs in view
of the importance of t:he case. So I think we won't take
any time for briefs. I will dispose of it now.
This case comes in here by certiorari. vVe all know
that under our pradice certiorari ordinarily brings up
only questions of law upon the record that is made in the
court from which the case is appealed.

The statute, un-

der which the case is brought, as I read it, provides for
appeal and author·izes the court under certain circumstances to review the facts as well ·as to review the law.
I am at a loss to know just what the rights and duties
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of the court are in view of the fact that the case is here
by certiorari instead of by appeal, but it seems to me I
.can dispose of the case without determining that question, and I feel that it can be disposed of on the record
under the law applicable to the statute, or I might say
under a reasonable construction of t1lw law applicable
to the statute.
The facts are well stated, if I exclude the argument,
in the decision of the referee as amended by the decision
.of the board, and confining myself solely to the facts
stated in those opinions and not to any arguments therein, I can adopt the statement of facts made by the refereP
and the board, and so we go right to the statute itself.
L-14-i39
AB-119-44

-2I have been greatly interested m the argument of
counsel on both sides, not only because of the study that
I have given the case, but because this is a part of the
new so.cial program that has come upon the country within the last few years. Of course the court is uot concerned with whether or not this statute is just or unjust
to industry, whet!hcr it is just or unjust to labor, nor
with possible abuses on both sides that may follow from
the execution of the law. I must try to get at the meaning of this statute and apply the facts as they are here
to it.

\Ve have referred in the argument repeatedly to Section 42, Paragraph 6, Subdivisions A, B and C, which
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provides that serviens performed by an individual for
remuneration s1hall be deemed to be employment subject
to the act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commission that three certain things arc present
in the case, which I shall enumerate. I take it that under
the language of the statute the burden of showing these
three is on the employer, and I shall so consider the
testimony.
/Subdivision A of the statute, reacling back a little
bit, provides that the service shall be deemed to be employment subject to the aet unless it is shown to the satisfadion of the commission, "A", that such individual
has been and will continue to be free from control or
direction over the performance of such scrviscs both under his contract of service and in fact. In disposing of
this question I must eonfine myself to the record as made
and I am thoroughly satisfied that the record in this case
shows that the labor here was that of an independent
contractor. In saying this, I confine myself to the record here. No one who lives in this country can fail to
apprecia tc that in every such eontraet there arc certain,
I might say, implied provisions that could probably be
shown that mig ht possibly make a different result, hut
it appears here flatly that the Heinz Lumber Company
had no control over this man.
1

W c know as a matter of fact that any man

~who

takes

a job of cutting a strip of timber must cut the kind of
timber that he is ·Cutting clean.

vV e know that if he

went

in and bntehcrcd a strip of timber he wouldn't be al-
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lowed to proceed on the job. \V e know a man peeling
posts and poles, eit1wr in the woods or on a landing, at
so much per pole, is working as a piece maker, but going
along vvith his contract, the duty on his part to peel the
poles that are brought to him. He wouldn't last very long
on his job if he picked out the medium size and easy to
peel poles and left the knotty ones and big ones for
someone else to peel. We know that the peeling of posts
and poles is seasonal. ·whether the contract provides
for it or not it must be done at eertain seasons of the
year to bQ effective and efficient. But that isn't here.
I merely mention that so that you will understand that
the court has not overlooked the possible situation that
may arise later.
So I am holding that this man was an independent
con tractor.
Now Subdivision B provides that the servwe s'hall
be presumed to be employment unless such serviee is
either outside the usual course of business for whic·h such
service is performed, or that such service is performed
outside of all the premises of the business or enterprise
for which such service is performed.
L-14-i39
AB-119-44
-3-

The testimony indicates that the business of the
Heinz Lumber Company is getting out timber, among
other kinds, the kinds that were peeled under this contract. I think it must be held on the evidence as a mat-
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ter of law that the work done here was within the usual
course of business for which the service was performed
for the employer, and I think it must be further held
that such service was performed at the place of business
of the enterprise for which it was performed. I know
of no other way ·Of treating a statute of this kind than
to so hold. If I own a piece of land and let another a
.contract to cut the timber on that land at so much a
thousand or so much a piece, it is my operation, and even
thougih I pay him by the piece, he is on my premises. He
may be an independent contractor, but he is on my place
of operation.
But I g-o one step further in answer to the argument
that has been made by counsel for the defendant. If I
let the contract to an independent contractor to do the
·work and he employs others to do it, that other is his
employee and not mine, and it is his operation and not
mine. He is merely my contractee.
Now we go to the third question, that the person
doing the work is an employee unless he is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. It appears here that the
work of peeling posts is in a sense a trade, but the language of the statute is ''independently established
trade". Now it does appear that this employee at another date was employed by a jobber for the Heinz Lumber
Company in an entirely different class of business, and
it appears that he sometimes worked by tlhe month.

I

think it cannot be said that this was an independently
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established trade at which he was customarily engaged
because he was customarily engaged in other lines of
work, and the particular business of peeling was seasonal.
So, that being true, the statute furnishing· these definitions of employment, I must hold t:hat this man was
employed within the meaning of this section. I haven't
overlooked the rulings of our courts, many of which have
been made in connection with our \Y orkrnen 's Compensation Act, and I haven't overlooked certain decisions of
the social security ad, but I think this act goes further,
and whether it is a good act or a bad one, whether it is
;just or unjust, I think it is the duty of the court to construe it as I see it, so the litigants vvill have an opportunity to have the question finally settled by the court
of last resort, if they desire to do so.
I haven't overlooked either the splendid argument
that the counsel have made on t'he question of the relation of these statutes to the common law, but I feel that
while there may be some difficulty in the application of
the statutory provisions to the facts in many cases, yet
the difficulty springs rather from the application than
from the language of the statute, as the language seems
clear. I think it was the intention of the legislature to
take a forward step in the matter of social legislation.
The courts should give a workable construction as they
have done with the Wiorkmen's Compensation Act.
L-14-i39
js/ FRANK A. BEL,L,
Circuit Judge.
Dated September 18th, 1939.
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EXHIBIT E
COPY

WASHINGTON
May 311938
Rec'd: Jul 27 1939
Region No. 5
Social Security
Board, 2 :00 p.m.

Office of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Address reply to
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and Refer to
SST:RR:2
The Texas Company,
13G East 42nd Street,
New York, New York.
Attention: Mr. Albert E. Van Dusen,
Attorney.
Sirs:
Reference is made to your letter dated January 15,
1938, with which was submitted certain information re-

lative to the facts and circumstances under which a particular individual operates a bulk plant for the marketing
and distributing of products supplied by your company
on a consignment basis. !Such information was submitted
for the purpose of enabling this office to determine the
status of such individual for purposes of the taxing provisions of the SocG.al Security Act.
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There were submitted with your letter a photostatic
copy of the consignment agreement, Form S-82 1-37 12M,
together with certain amendments thereto, entered into
between your company and Mr. J. E. Thomas, Marion,
Virginia; a copy of a manual called ''Successful Bulk
Station Operation," which is furnished to Mr. Thomas
by the company; and copies of rulings from various State
governmental agencies relative to the status of consignees under certain aets and regulations of the particular States.
The information submitted discloses that Mr. Thomas
is appointed as a consignment agent of The Texas Company at Abingdon, Virginia. The company ships its
products to the consignee at its own expense and title
thereto remains in the company until the products are
sold by the consignee in accordance with the terms of his
agreement with the company. The consignee is prohibited by the company from selling its products, directly or indirectly, at less than the authorized prices established by the company. He be.r~omes personally responsible for any credit extended in excess of the limit placed
on eaeh aecount by the company, or for any sum due on
any account opened by him without authority from the
company.

He is required to perform services in col-

lecting and remitting all amounts due the company as
the result of sales of its products from his bulk plant.

If any deliveries of the company's approved accessories
stocked in his bulk plant are made outside of the regular
truck delivery radius of his bulk plant, the company
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The Texas Company.
bears the cost of transportation from the bulk plant to
the destination.
Mr. Thomas Is required to submit detailed reports
as requested by the company, on forms prescribed and
furnished by tho company, of all the company's money,
goods, produets, equipment, etc., in his possession or
coming into his custody. It appears also that tho books
and records and everything at the bulk plant pertaining
to tho company's business are subject to inspection by accredited station auditors .of the company. The consignee
agrees to furnish his own trucks and other equipment
required for the distribution of the company's products,

but such trucks and equipment must conform with standards

pres(~ribecl

therefor by the company. l-Ie is required

to indemnify the company against Ji,ability for any premiums, taxes or contributions for workmen's compensation insurance, unemployment insurance or old-age pensions imposed by any State or Federal law, whieh are
measured by the remuneration paid to individuals engaged by him to perform services under his agreement
with the company.

He is further required to furnish a

bond satisfactory to the company, protecting the compan;· against the loss of any of its property coming into
his custody.

The consignment agreement may be termi-

nated by either Mr. Thomas or The Texas Company on
five days' written notice.
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You are advised that careful consideration has bet•n
given to all of the information submitted concerning the
facts and circumstances under which Mr. rrhomas operates his bulk plant under a consignment agreement with
your company, and in the opinion of this office ::mch information di::;eloses that your company exercises or retains the right to exercise the control over the services
of such consignee which is prescribed by the regulations
under rritles VIli and IX of the Act as being necessary
to establish the relationship of employer awl employee
for purposes of the t axes imposed thereunder. Such
right of c~ontrol is evideneed in part by the fact that the
consignee is required to perform certain services as clircded by the company, such as submitting reports and
collecting money due the eompany. The company also
controls the extension of crc<1it by the con::;ignce, antl the
minimum prices at which its products may be sold. Trucks
and other equipment furnished by the consignee must
conform with standards set by the company therefor.
Also, the right of the eompany to terminate the agreement without cause on five days' notice, while not conclusive in and of itself, is nevertheless a fartor indieating
direct or indirect control on the part of the com pan~·.
1

In view of the right of control whieh The Texas
Company retaiu::; over the services of the consignee in
question, the fad that in certain respects he is free to
usc his own judgment and initiative in conducting the
business at the bulk plant is not considered ronclu::;ive
for the purpose of determining his status under Titles
VIII and IX of the Ad. It is concluded, therefore, that
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Mr. Thomas is an employee of The Texas Company for
purposes of the taxing provisions of the Act.
You are further advised that this office has consistently held that iu cases in which the employees of a
company, with either the express or implied consent of
that company, engage other individuals to assist them
in the performance of their services for the company,
such other individuals are also employees of the company rather than of the individuals by whom they are
engaged. Therefore, since Mr. Thomas is held to be an
employee of The Texas Company, any individuals enThe Texas Company.
gaged by him with the express or implied consent of the
company to perform services in connection with his employment by the company are also, to the extent that
they perform such services, employees of the company
for purposes of the taxing provisions of the Act.
For the purpose of determining the taxable wages
of Mr. Thomas, the total amount of the wages of each
employee engaged by him which is attributable to services performed in the business of the company should be
deducted from the total amount of his commissions. A
deduction from such amount may also be made for any
other expenses he incurs in the business of The Texas
Company, provided he aecounts to the company for all
such expenses and the company maintains adequate
records in substanti'ation thereof.

ff proper accounting

is not made of such expenses, or if the necessary records
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with respect thereto are not maintained, the taxable
wages of Mr. Thomas will be the total amount of his
commissions minus the total ,amount of the wages of the
employees engaged by him which are attributable to the
services mentioned above.
It is neeessary, therefore, for your company to maintain such records as ~will show, in addition to other information, the portions of the total amount of Mr.
Thomas' eommissions \vhieh represent, respeetivcl:v, his
taxable wages and the taxable wages of eac'h of the employees engaged by him, and if a deduction is to be made
for the uxpenses incurred by Mr. Thomas or his helpers,
records must be kept of such expenses.

In connection with the provision in the agreement
with Mr. Thomas, whereby Rucib individual aRsumes
liability for certain taxes, contributions and premiums
vvith respect to the remuneration of his helpers, it may
be stated that the Bureau will interpose no objertion to
the execution of an agreement between a taxpayer and
another person whereby such other person assumes payment of the taxes imposed under the Social Seemity Act.
However, your attention is directed to the fact that the
taxing provisions of the Act arc mandatory and that such
an agreement does not relieve the taxpayer from responsibility for keeping the necessary records and filing
the prescribed returns, or from liability for the payment
of the taxes imposed under Titles VIII and IX of the
Act. Accordingly, it will be necess,ary for your company
to include in its returns filed under those titles of the
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kct the wages of Mr. Thomas and of each individual engaged to assist him in the performance of :his services
for the company.
Although the ruling set forth above is made upon the
basis of the information submitted concerning Mr.
Thomas, such ruling is also applicable to the cases of
other consignees similarly engaged by your company,
provided the facts of such other eases do not vary in any
material respect from the facts upon which this ruling
is based.
Respectfully,

GUY T. HELVERING
JD

Commissioner.
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Charles Weiser jsj
Clerk.
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